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Abstract
Game-theoretic upper expectations are joint (global) probabilitymodels thatmathematically describe the beha-
viour of uncertain processes in terms of supermartingales; capital processes corresponding to available betting
strategies. Compared to (the more common) measure-theoretic expectation functionals, they are not bounded
to restrictive assumptions such as measurability or precision, yet succeed in preserving, or even generalising
manyof their fundamental properties. We focus on adiscrete-time settingwhere local state spaces are finite and,
in this specific context, build on the existing work of Shafer and Vovk; the main developers of the framework of
game-theoretic upper expectations. In a first part, we study Shafer and Vovk’s characterisation of a local upper
expectation and showhow it is related toWalley’s behavioural notion of coherence. The second part consists in a
study of game-theoretic upper expectations on amore global level, where several alternative definitions, as well
as a broad range of properties are derived, e.g. the law of iterated upper expectations, compatibility with local
models, coherence properties,. . .Our main contribution, however, concerns the continuity behaviour of these
operators. We prove continuity with respect to non-increasing sequences of so-called lower cuts and continu-
ity with respect to non-increasing sequences of finitary functions. We moreover show that the game-theoretic
upper expectation is uniquely determined by its values on the domain of bounded below limits of finitary func-
tions, and additionally show that, for any such limit, the limiting sequence can be constructed in such away that
the game-theoretic upper expectation is continuous with respect to this particular sequence.
Keywords: Game-theoretic probability, Upper expectation, Coherence, Continuity properties, Finitary
function
1. Introduction
We consider sequences X1,X2, ...,Xn , ... of uncertain states where the state Xk at each discrete time k ∈ N
takes values in a fixed finite state spaceX . The uncertain evolution of the state Xk in such a sequence—which
we will call a discrete-time finite-state uncertain process—can be mathematically described in various ways.
Most authors prefer a measure-theoretic approach, which involves the use of countably additive probability
measures. In this paper, we consider an alternative, game-theoretic approach that uses (super)martingales as a
primitive notion. Probabilities and expectations then only appear as derived, secondary objects. This approach
was largely developed by Shafer and Vovk [10, 11], but someof the essential ideas that underly it were due to Ville
[19].
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Irrespectively of the chosenmathematical framework, the starting point for modelling an uncertain process
is typically a set of assessments about the local uncertain behaviour of the process. Such local assessments rep-
resent our beliefs on how the process’ state Xk will change from one time instant to the next. In a traditional
approach, they are given in the form of probabilities P(Xk+1 = xk+1|X1 = x1, · · · ,Xk = xk ) for each possible history
X1 = x1, · · · ,Xk = xk (with xi ∈X ) and for each possible value xk+1 ∈X for the next state Xk+1. However, when
information is scarce or when we want to act conservatively, specifying such a single probability measure for
each history might not be appropriate or not even justified. In such cases, our beliefs can be more accurately
described by imprecise probabilitymodels [1, 21], e.g. probability intervals, sets of probability charges (ormeas-
ures), sets of desirable gambles or upper and lower expectations. Each of these models allows us to express and
incorporate partial knowledge about the parameters that would normally make up a traditional precise probab-
ility model. We will here focus on one particular—yet general and unifying—such imprecise probability model:
upper and lower expectations (or previsions).
Upper and lower expectations generalise traditional expectation operators in the sense that the additivity
property is replaced by the weaker condition of sub- or super-additivity respectively. A typical interpretation
for them is that they are respective upper and lower bounds on a set of plausible expectations. In fact, it can
be shown that they are in a one-to-one relation with closed, convex sets of linear expectations [21] or, equival-
ently, closed convex sets of probability charges or measures. Interval probabilities therefore only correspond
to a special case. Walley [21], on the other hand, uses a behavioural interpretation where bounded real-valued
functions on a non-empty set Y represent gambles with an uncertain payoff and where the upper (or lower)
expectation E( f ) (or E( f )) of such a gamble f represents a subject’s infimum selling price (or supremum buying
price) for f . By imposing that a subject should gamble rationally—which he calls ‘coherence’—Walley then ob-
tains the same axioms as those of a sub- or superadditive expectation operator. Walley’s interpretationmoreover
naturally connects upper and lower expectations with another type of imprecise probability model, called ‘sets
of desirable gambles’, which models uncertainty by considering the gambles a subject finds desirable. Due to
its different interpretations and its connections with various other (imprecise) uncertainty models, the theory
of upper and lower expectations has a unifying role within the field of imprecise probabilities, hence our choice
for using them here to model uncertainty in stochastic processes. More detailed information about lower and
upper expectations can be found in References [6, 21].
So suppose that, for each possible history X1 = x1, · · · ,Xk = xk , we are given an upper expectation Ex1:k that
expresses our beliefs about the value of the next state Xk+1. How can we use these assessments to draw con-
clusions about more general behaviour of the process? For instance, what is the probability that the process’
state will ever be equal to a particular value x ∈ X ? When do we expect this to happen for the first time? Such
inferences relate to the value of the process’ state at multiple time instances. To make statements about them,
we need a global uncertainty model that incorporates and extends the information included in the local uncer-
tainty models Ex1:k . One particularly interesting way to construct such a global model was proposed by Shafer
and Vovk [10, 11].
They picture a game that consists of a (possibly infinite) series of rounds and three players, called Forecaster,
Skeptic and Reality. In the beginning of each round, Forecaster declares how he is willing to gamble on the
outcome of the current round. Subsequently, Skeptic takes him up on his commitments and chooses a gamble
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from the ones offered by Forecaster. At the end of the round, Reality decides the outcome and Forecaster and
Skeptic exchange money accordingly. Now, given Forecaster his assessments, how should Skeptic determine a
selling (or buying) price for a gamble f whose uncertain payoff depends on an entire realisationω—whichmay
take an infinitely long time—of the game? Shafer and Vovk argue that Skeptic should certainly agree on selling
the gamble f for any price α such that there is a gambling strategy for Skeptic that starts with an initial capital α
and allows him to end up with at least as much money than the payoff f (ω) corresponding to f , irrespectively
of the realisationω of the game. The lower envelope of all such prices α, which entirely depends on Forecaster’s
local assessments, is thenwhat Shafer and Vovk call the game-theoretic upper expectation of f . Game-theoretic
lower expectations are subsequently defined in an analogous, yet dual way.
In the setting that we consider, Forecaster’s local assessments are modelled by the local upper expectations
Ex1:k and the allowed gambles for Skeptic are those functions f on X for which Ex1:k ( f ) ≤ 0.
2 The evolution of
Skeptic’s capital correspondingwith anallowable betting strategy is called a supermartingale. As sketched above,
these supermartingales can be used to define (global) game-theoretic upper and lower expectations. Mathemat-
ically speaking, these operators have the advantage of being very general, in the sense that they do not rely on an
assumption ofmeasurability or on an assumption that uncertainty should bemodelled through traditional (pre-
cise) probabilitymodels. Despite their generality, they also possess rather strong technical properties, therefore
maintaining great practical usefulness. Though many slightly different definitions of the game-theoretic upper
expectation can be found throughout the literature, the key elements always remain the same. We consider one
particular definitionhere, sincewebelieve it to have, in our setting, superiormathematical properties compared
to other versions; wewill argue so in Section 8. Moreover, the versionwe consider can also be elegantly character-
ised as the most conservative uncertainty model that satisfies a set of intuitive axioms, and its use can therefore
also be motivated without relying on an interpretation in terms of supermartingales or other game-theoretic
concepts [15, 16].
The contribution of this paper is fourfold, yet serves the general aim of strengthening the theory and relev-
ance of game-theoretic upper expectations for the case where the state spaceX is finite.
Our first contribution consists in bringing clarity about a number of properties that were already proved
elsewhere for game-theoretic upper expectations, but usually in a slightly other setting or for a slightly other
version of its definition. This in particular concerns the more basic properties (e.g. compatibility with local
models, law of iterated upper expectations,. . . ) in Section 4, the equivalent definitions given in Section 5 and the
non-decreasing continuity property in Section 6. In order to remain fully self-contained and to avoid confusion
on this part, we will give an independent proof of these (or similar) results, yet the essential ideas often remain
the same. We will explicitly mention this if we do so.
Our second contribution consists in showing that—for a finite state space X—our version of the game-
theoretic upper expectation also satisfies several new continuity properties. Such properties are powerful math-
ematical tools that provide the resulting theory with elegance and also greatly enhance its practical scope. The
continuity of the Lebesgue integral, for instance, is one of the reasons why it is the integral of choice for com-
puting expected values associated with a probability measure [2, 13]. We show in Section 6 that game-theoretic
2Note that there is a close relation with Walley’s interpretation for upper expectations here; we refer to [5] for an extensive study.
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upper expectations satisfy continuity with respect to non-decreasing sequences (as pointed out in the previous
paragraph, this property is not entirely new), continuity with respect to non-increasing sequences of lower cuts
and a version of Fatou’s lemma. In Section 7, we focus on continuity with respect to sequences of so-called fi-
nitary functions. Such finitary functions only depend on the process’ state at a finite number of time instances.
They canbe given a clear interpretation [15, 16] and their upper expectations canoftenbe calculated in a straight-
forward manner [8, 18]. And although many practically relevant functions are themselves not finitary, most of
them can still be written as the (pointwise) limit of a sequence of finitary functions [7, 18], e.g. hitting times,
hitting probabilities, ... We prove continuity with respect to non-increasing sequences of finitary functions,
and show that for any bounded below (pointwise) limit of finitary functions, the limiting sequence can be con-
structed in such a way that the game-theoretic upper expectation is continuous with respect to this particular
sequence. Finally, we will also show that the game-theoretic upper expectation is uniquely determined by its
values on the domain of all bounded below (pointwise) limits of finitary functions.
Our third contribution—whichwill be the topic of Section 2 and, to a small extent, also of Section 6—consists
in bridging part of the gap that currently exists between what Shafer and Vovk do, and the work on upper and
lower expectations (or previsions) in the field of imprecise probabilities. The latter is often based on Walley’s
notion of coherence which only considers upper (and lower) expectations on bounded real-valued functions. In
sucha context, the connectionwith Shafer andVovk’s earlierworkwas already studied elaborately in [5]. We here
deal with extended real-valued functions and study how both approaches are related on a local level. We first
propose a slightly weaker—and therefore, more general—version of Shafer and Vovk’s axioms for a local upper
expectation and show that, for a finite state space, this weaker version can equivalently be obtained by combin-
ing coherence (on bounded real-valued functions) with an upward continuity axiom. This result shows that the
local upper expectations defined in this way are, on the domain of bounded below extended real-valued func-
tions, uniquely determined by their values on bounded real-valued functions. This allows us to justify the use of
our local models (on the domain of bounded below functions)—and therefore, also the use of the global game-
theoretic upper expectations that are derived from them—fromamore conventional imprecise probability point
of view [16]. Moreover, by the end of Section 6, it will become clear that a particular downward continuity axiom
needs to be satisfied by the local upper expectations in order for them to be (completely) compatible with the
global game-theoretic upper expectation. This is generally not the case, not even if we would axiomatise local
upper expectations in the stronger way as proposed by Shafer and Vovk; see Section 2. Hence, if one desires
compatibility of local and global models, he will need to additionally impose the downward continuity axiom.
Our fourth and final contribution can be found in Section 8, where we compare different definitions of the
game-theoretic upper expectation and arguewhywehave chosen toworkwith theparticular version considered
here. We take into account not only technical aspects, but also interpretational aspects of the possible defini-
tions. We feel the need to include such a discussion here, because, as already mentioned, many different defin-
itions have been used in the literature and it is often unclear—especially for an unexperienced reader—how
these different versions relate to each other. Wemoreover show there that our particular definition of the game-
theoretic upper expectation can be replaced by a more intuitive one, if we restrict ourselves to bounded real-
valued functions.
In short, the outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 shows how upper expectations on a finite state space
4
can be equivalently axiomatised, either in a way similar to what Shafer and Vovk propose, either using Walley’s
concept of coherence together with a continuity axiom. In Section 3, we use the upper expectations of Section 2
as local uncertaintymodels in a process and show how these can then be used to define supermartingales and a
global game-theoretic upper expectation. Sections 4-7 then focus on themathematical properties of this global
operator. We conclude the article in Section 8 with a discussion on other possible versions of game-theoretic
upper expectations.
2. Upper Expectations
We consider and relate two possible approaches for characterising upper expectations on extended real-
valued functions: one similar to Shafer andVovk’s axiomatisation, andone thatusesWalley’snotionof coherence
in combination with an upward continuity axiom. Since we will later on use these characterisations to define
local upper expectations in uncertain processes with a finite state space, we will mainly focus on extended real-
valued functions with finite domain here. We show that, in that case, both characterisations are equivalent.
Moreover, it will turn out that the characterising axioms of an upper expectation are also satisfied by the global
game-theoretic upper expectation that we will consider further on, which indeed allows us to call this global
operator an upper expectation.
We start by introducing some preliminary notions. We denote the set of all natural numbers, without 0, by
N, and letN0 :=N∪{0}. The set of extended real numbers is denoted byR :=R∪{+∞,−∞}. The set of positive
real numbers is denoted byR>0, the set of non-negative real numbers byR≥0, and we also letR>0 :=R>0∪{+∞}
and R≥0 := R≥0 ∪ {+∞}. We extend the total order relation < on R to R by positing that −∞ < c < +∞ for all
c ∈R and endowRwith the associated order topology.
For any non-empty setY , a variable f onY is a map on Y . We say that an extended real(-valued) variable
f is bounded below if there is anM ∈R such that f ≥M—meaning that f (y ) ≥M for all y ∈Y—and bounded
above if− f is bounded below. A gamble onY is a real(-valued) variable onY that is bounded, meaning that it is
bothbounded belowandbounded above. The set of all extended real variables onY is denoted byL (Y ), the set
of all bounded below extended real variables onY byL b (Y ) and the linear space of all gambles onY byL (Y ).
For any f ∈L (Y )we use sup f and inf f to denote the supremum sup{ f (y ) : y ∈Y } and infimum inf{ f (y ) : y ∈
Y } of the variable f , respectively. We say that a sequence { fn}n∈N0 inL (Y ) is uniformly bounded below if there
is anM ∈ R such that fn ≥M for all n ∈ N0. For any sequence { fn}n∈N0 inL (Y ), we write limn→+∞ fn to mean
the pointwise limit of the functions fn . For a subset A ofY , we define the indicator IA of A as the gamble on Y
that assumes the value 1 on A and 0 elsewhere.
Upper expectations according to Shafer and Vovk
The following definition of an upper expectation is very similar to what Shafer, Vovk and Takemura call a
‘superexpectation’ in [12] and an ‘upper expectation’ in [11].3
3Their definition is, as far as we know, not based on a single interpretation. Rather, they draw inspiration from various subfields in
probability theory to obtain these axioms.
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Definition1. Consider any non-empty setY and anyL b (Y )⊆D ⊆L (Y ). Then we define an upper expectation
E onD as an extended real-valued map onD that satisfies the following axioms:
E1. E(c ) = c for all c ∈R;
E2. E( f + g )≤ E( f ) +E(g ) for all f ,g ∈L b (Y );
E3. E(λ f ) =λE( f ) for all λ ∈R>0 and all f ∈L b (Y );
E4. f ≤ g ⇒ E( f )≤ E(g ) for all f ,g ∈L b (Y ).
E5. limn→+∞E( fn ) = E
 
limn→+∞ fn

for anynon-decreasing sequence { fn }n∈N0 of non-negative variables inL b (Y ).
Alternatively, we can also consider the so-called conjugate lower expectation E, defined by E( f ) := −E(− f )
for all f ∈ −D := { f ∈ L (Y ) : − f ∈ D}. It clearly suffices to focus on only one of the two functionals and we
will work mainly with upper expectations. Furthermore, in the definition above, as well as further on, we adopt
the following conventions: c +∞ = +∞ for all real c , +∞+∞ = +∞, λ (+∞) = +∞ for all λ ∈ R>0 and
0 (+∞) = 0. In addition to E1–E5, we will sometimes also impose ‘continuity with respect to lower cuts’ (also
called ‘bounded-below support’) on an upper expectation. To introduce this property, let f ∨c for any f ∈L (Y )
and any c ∈ R be the variable defined by f ∨c (y ) :=max{ f (y ), c } for all y ∈ Y . An upper expectation E on D is
then continuous with respect to lower cuts if
E6. E( f ) = limc→−∞E( f
∨c ) for all f ∈D .
The limit on the right hand side exists because f ∨c ∈ L b (Y ) is non-decreasing in c ∈ R and E satisfies E4 by
assumption. Axiom E6 will play a particularly important role later on, when we will study the compatibility of
local and global game-theoretic upper expectations. Moreover, we will also already use E6 in this section, to
establish an important relation between our definition of an upper expectation and the one used by Shafer and
Vovk.
The definition of Shafer and Vovk (and Takemura) [11, Section 6.1] only differs fromDefinition 1 with regard
to the choice of domain and the variables for which axioms E2, E3 and E4 should hold. Their definition is stated
forD =L (Y ) and requires that E2–E4 should hold on all ofL (Y ):
E2’. E( f + g )≤ E( f ) +E(g ) for all f ,g ∈L (Y );
E3’. E(λ f ) =λE( f ) for all λ ∈R>0 and all f ∈L (Y );
E4’. f ≤ g ⇒ E( f )≤ E(g ) for all f ,g ∈L (Y ),
where theyuse the convention that+∞−∞ =−∞+∞=+∞. This is a typical choicewhenworkingwithupper
expectations—also see [4] where they use the dual convention for lower expectations—and we will henceforth
use this convention without mentioning it explicitly. So, for example, a ≥ b implies that a − b ≥ 0, but not
necessarily 0 ≥ b − a for any two a and b in R. Moreover, we also adopt the conventions that c −∞= −∞ for
all real c , −∞−∞=−∞, λ (−∞) =−∞ and (−λ) (+∞) =−∞ for all λ ∈R>0 and 0 (−∞) = 0.
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Now, it is clear that axioms E2–E4 are weaker than axioms E2’–E4’ and hence, that our definition of an upper
expectation ismore general than Shafer and Vovk’s definition. However, if we chooseD =L (Y ) and, besides E1–
E5, additionally impose E6 on our upper expectations, then we always obtain an upper expectation according
to Shafer and Vovk:
Proposition 1. Consider any non-empty set Y and any upper expectation E onL (Y ). Then E satisfies E2’–E4’ if
it satisfies E6.
Proof. E2’: Consider any two f ,g ∈ L (Y ) and any c ∈ R. Then, since f ∨c ≥ c and g ∨c ≥ c , we have that
f ∨c + g ∨c ≥ 2c . In a similar way, we deduce that f ∨c + g ∨c ≥ f + g . Hence, combining both inequalities, we
obtain that f ∨c + g ∨c ≥max{ f + g , 2c }= ( f + g )∨2c . Moreover note that f ∨c , g ∨c and ( f + g )∨2c are all variables
inL b (Y ), so we can apply E4 and subsequently E2 to infer that
E
 
( f + g )∨2c

≤ E( f ∨c + g ∨c )≤ E( f ∨c ) +E(g ∨c ).
The inequality above holds for any c ∈R, so we have that
E( f + g )
E6
= lim
c→−∞
E
 
( f + g )∨c

= lim
c→−∞
E
 
( f + g )∨2c

≤ lim
c→−∞

E( f ∨c ) +E(g ∨c )

= lim
c→−∞
E( f ∨c ) + lim
c→−∞
E(g ∨c )
E6
= E( f ) +E(g ),
where the existence of all the limits follows from themonotonicity [E4] of E, andwhere the second to last equality
follows from the fact that E( f ∨c ) and E(g ∨c ) are non-decreasing in c and our convention that +∞−∞=+∞.
E3’: Consider any f ∈ L (Y ). First note that, since multiplication with a positive constant λ ∈ R>0 is order
preserving on R, we have that max{λ f (y ), c } =max{λ f (y ),λc/λ} = λmax{ f (y ), c/λ} for all y ∈ Y and all c ∈ R.
Hence, (λ f )∨c = λ f ∨
c/λ for all c ∈R and all λ ∈R>0. Since moreover f ∨
c/λ ∈L b (Y ), we can apply E3 to infer that
E
 
(λ f )∨c

= E
 
λ f ∨
c/λ

= λE
 
f ∨
c/λ

for all c ∈R and all λ ∈R>0. This then implies that
E
 
λ f
 E6
= lim
c→−∞
E
 
(λ f )∨c

= lim
c→−∞
λE
 
f ∨
c/λ

= λ lim
c→−∞
E
 
f ∨
c/λ

=λ lim
c→−∞
E
 
f ∨c
 E6
= λE
 
f

for all λ ∈R>0.
E4’: This follows trivially from the monotonicity [E4] of E onL b (Y ) in combination with E6.
The following counterexample shows that the converse is not necessarily true and hence, that axioms E1–E6
define a strictly smaller set of upper expectation operators onL (Y ) compared to Shafer and Vovk’s axioms.
Example 1. Consider any set Y such that |Y |> 1 and the extended real-valued map E:L (Y )→R defined by
E( f ) :=
¨
−∞ if f <+∞ pointwise and f (y ) =−∞ for some y ∈Y ;
sup f otherwise,
for all f ∈L (Y ). We show that E satisfies E1, E2’–E4’ and E5, but not E6.
E1: This follows trivially from the definition of E.
E2’: Consider any two f ,g ∈L (Y ). If there is some y ∈Y such that f (y ) = +∞, thenwe have that E( f ) = +∞
and therefore also that E( f )+E(g ) = +∞, which implies the desired inequality. Due to symmetry, the inequality is
also satisfied if g (y ) = +∞ for some y ∈Y . Hence, consider the case where both f <+∞ and g <+∞ pointwise.
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Then we clearly also have that f + g < +∞ pointwise. If moreover f (y ) = −∞ for some y ∈ Y , then also f (y ) +
g (y ) =−∞ (because g (y )<+∞) which, together with the fact that f +g <+∞ pointwise, implies thatE( f +g ) =
−∞ and thus the desired inequality. Oncemore, the same can be concluded if g (y ) =−∞ for some y ∈Y because
of symmetry. Hence, we are left with the situationwhere both f and g—and therefore also f +g—are real-valued.
Then we can immediately infer that E( f + g ) = sup( f + g )≤ sup f + supg = E( f ) +E(g ).
E3’: Consider any λ ∈ R>0 and any f ∈ L (Y ). If f < +∞ pointwise and f (y ) = −∞ for some y ∈ Y , then
also λ f < +∞ pointwise and λ f (y ) = −∞, which implies that λE( f ) = λ(−∞) = −∞ = E(λ f ). Otherwise, if
f > −∞ pointwise or f (y ) = +∞ for some y ∈Y , then also λ f >−∞ pointwise or λ f (y ) = +∞, which implies
that λE( f ) = λsup f = supλ f = E(λ f ).
E4’: Consider any f ,g ∈ L (Y ) such that f ≤ g . If f < +∞ pointwise and f (y ) = −∞ for some y ∈ Y , then
E( f ) = −∞ and therefore automatically E( f ) ≤ E(g ). Otherwise, if f > −∞ pointwise or f (y ) = +∞ for some
y ∈ Y , then also g > −∞ pointwise or g (y ) = +∞ for some y ∈Y . Then it follows from the definition of E that
E( f ) = sup f ≤ supg = E(g ).
E5: Consider any non-decreasing sequence { fn}n∈N0 of non-negative variables in L (Y ). Since fn ≥ 0 > −∞
pointwise, we have that E( fn ) = sup fn for all n ∈N0. Clearly, f := limn→+∞ fn is non-negative too, so we also have
that E( f ) = sup f . Hence, we infer that
lim
n→+∞
E( fn ) = lim
n→+∞
sup
y ∈Y
fn (y ) = sup
n∈N0
sup
y ∈Y
fn (y ) = sup
y ∈Y
sup
n∈N0
fn (y ) = sup
y ∈Y
f (y ) = E( f ),
where the second and the fourth equality follows from the non-decreasing character of { fn}n∈N0 .
So E is an upper expectation on L (Y ) that moreover satisfies the additional axioms E2’–E4’. However, it is
easy to see that it does not satisfy E6. Indeed, consider the extended real variable −∞Iy where y ∈ Y . Then we
have that E(−∞Iy ) =−∞. On the other hand, E((−∞Iy )
∨c ) = E(c Iy ) = 0 for all non-positive c ∈R (indeed, note
that sup c Iy = 0 because |Y |> 1). So E(−∞Iy ) = +∞6= 0= limc→−∞E((−∞Iy )
∨c ), which implies that E does not
satisfy E6. ◊
Now, our reason for establishing Proposition 1 is not merely because of the result itself, but rather because it
will allow us to draw the following essential conclusion: as far as the global game-theoretic upper expectation—
ourmain object of interest in this paper—is concerned, it does not matter whatD is and whether we do, or do not
additionally impose E2’–E4’ on the local upper expectations. In order to see this, it suffices for now to know that
the global game-theoretic upper expectation—which will only be introduced later on in Section 3—will only de-
pend on the values of our local upper expectations on the (sub)domainL b (Y ) (these local upper expectations
are simply upper expectations on D , with L b (Y ) ⊆ D ⊆ L (Y ), where Y is the local state space X of the con-
sidered process). So our statement follows if we can show that letting D =L (Y ) and imposing axioms E2’–E4’
on (local) upper expectations, does not restrict the possible values that these upper expectations can take on the
subdomainL b (Y ). To show this, we consider for any upper expectation E on D , withL b (Y ) ⊆D ⊆L (Y ), the
map EE6 :L (Y )→R defined by
EE6( f ) := limc→−∞
E( f ∨c ) for all f ∈L (Y ),
where the right hand side is well-defined because f ∨c ∈L b (Y ) for any c ∈R and E satisfies E4 (therefore imply-
ing the existence of the limit). Then it is quite easy to see that EE6 coincides with E on L b (Y ) and that it is an
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upper expectation that furthermore satisfies E6 and therefore, by Proposition 1, also satisfies E2’–E4’.
Proposition 2. Consider any non-empty set Y and anyL b (Y ) ⊆ D ⊆L (Y ). For any upper expectation E on D ,
the associated map EE6 is an upper expectation onL (Y ) that coincides with E onL b (Y )—and hence extends E
ifD =L b (Y )—and that moreover satisfies E6 and E2’–E4’.
Proof. The map EE6 coincides with E on L b (Y )—and hence extends E if D = L b (Y )—because, for any f ∈
L b (Y ), we have that f
∨c = f for all c ∈R such that c ≤ inf f , and hence, EE6( f ) = limc→−∞ E( f
∨c ) = E( f ). Since
EE6 coincides with E on L b (Y ) and since E is an upper expectation, it is now immediate that EE6 is an upper
expectation as well. Furthermore, again since EE6 coincides with E onL b (Y ), it follows from its definition that
EE6 satisfies E6 and hence, due to Proposition 1, that it also satisfies E2’–E4’.
This result, together with the fact that our global game-theoretic upper expectations will only depend on
the restriction of our local models toL b (Y ), indeed confirms our statement above. For this reason, and since
settingD =L (Y ) and imposing axioms E2’–E4’ would only reduce the generality of whatwe do, we have chosen
to only require that L b (Y ) ⊆ D ⊆ L (Y ) and to adopt E1–E5 as our axioms for an upper expectation. In some
cases, however, whenwedesire compatibility of local and globalmodels, wewill letD =L (Y ) and impose E6 on
our local upper expectations, which by Proposition 1 and Example 1 is actually stronger than imposing E2’–E4’.
Some Basic Properties of Upper Expectations
We now continue this section with a second part in which we establish various properties of upper expecta-
tions that will prove convenient for the rest of the paper, or, as is for example the case for Proposition 5 below,
are just interesting in their own right.
Proposition3. Consider any non-empty setY , anyL b (Y )⊆D ⊆L (Y ) and any extended real-valuedmap E on
D that satisfies E1–E4, and let E be the conjugate map of E defined on −D . Then we have that
E7. −∞< inf f ≤ E( f )≤ sup f for all f ∈L b (Y );
E8. E( f +µ) = E( f ) +µ for all µ ∈R∪{+∞} and all f ∈L b (Y );
E9. E(λ f ) =λE( f ) for all λ ∈R≥0 and all f ∈L b (Y ).
E10. E( f + g )≤ E( f ) +E(g )≤ E( f + g ) for all f ,g ∈L (Y );
E11. if limn→+∞ sup | f − fn |= 0 then limn→+∞ |E( f )−E( fn )|= 0 for any sequence { fn}n∈N0 inL (Y ).
If Emoreover satisfies E5, then we also have that
E12. limn→+∞E( fn ) = E
 
limn→+∞ fn

for any non-decreasing sequence { fn}n∈N0 inL b (Y ).
Proof. E7: Consider any f ∈L b (Y ). If sup f =+∞, we trivially have that E( f )≤ sup f . If sup f is real, it follows
immediately from E4 that E( f ) ≤ E(sup f ) and therefore that E( f ) ≤ sup f because of E1. That sup f = −∞, is
impossible because f is bounded below. To see that −∞ < inf f ≤ E( f ), note that inf f is real or equal to +∞
[because f is bounded below] and therefore that −∞ < inf f is automatically satisfied. Moreover, for any real
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α < inf f we clearly have that α < f , implying by E4 and E1 that α < E( f ). Since this holds for any α < inf f we
indeed have that inf f ≤ E( f ).
E8: That E( f + µ) ≤ E( f ) + µ for all real µ and all f ∈ L b (Y ), follows directly from E2 and E1. The other
inequality follows from the fact that
E( f ) = E( f +µ−µ)
E2
≤ E( f +µ) +E(−µ)
E1
= E( f +µ)−µ,
for all f ∈ L b (Y ) and all real µ. If µ = +∞, then since E( f ) > −∞ [because of E7], it remains to check that
E(+∞) = +∞, which follows trivially from E7.
E9: If λ = 0, we have to show that E(0) = 0, which follows immediately from E1. Otherwise, if λ ∈ R>0, the
equality follows from E3.
E10: For all f ,g ∈L (Y )we have that
E( f ) = E( f + g − g )
E2
≤ E( f + g ) +E(−g ) = E( f + g )−E(g ),
where the last step follows from the definition of E. Hence, because −E(g ) = E(−g ) is real by E7 [g is a gamble],
we have that E( f )+E(g )≤ E( f +g ) for all f ,g ∈L (Y ). The remaining inequality then follows immediately from
conjugacy. Indeed, for any f ,g ∈ L (Y ), we already have that E(−g )+E(− f ) ≤ E(−g + (− f )). By conjugacy, this
implies that −E(g )−E( f )≤−E(g + f ) and therefore that E( f ) +E(g )≥ E( f + g ) for any f ,g ∈L (Y ).
E11: It is easy to see that, if limn→+∞ sup | f − fn |= 0 for some sequence { fn}n∈N0 of gambles, then f is also a
gamble and so is each f − fn . Hence, it follows from E10 that
E( f − fn )≤ E( f ) +E(− fn )≤ E( f − fn ) for all n ∈N0. (1)
If we now apply E7 to E( f − fn ), and E7 and conjugacy to E( f − fn ), it follows from (1) that inf( f − fn ) ≤ E( f ) +
E(− fn ) ≤ sup( f − fn ) for all n ∈N0. Since moreover E( f ) +E(− fn ) = E( f )−E( fn ) for all n ∈N0, we then have that
limn→+∞ |E( f )−E( fn )|= 0 due to the fact that limn→+∞ sup | f − fn |= 0.
E12: Let { fn}n∈N0 be any non-decreasing sequence inL b (Y ). Since f0 is bounded below and { fn}n∈N0 is non-
decreasing, { fn}n∈N0 is uniformly boundedbelowby someM ∈R. Therefore, { fn−M }n∈N0 is a non-decreasing se-
quence of non-negative variables inL (Y ). Hence, due to E5, we have that limn→+∞E( fn−M ) = E(limn→+∞ fn−
M ), which is equivalent to limn→+∞E( fn ) = E(limn→+∞ fn ) due to E8 [which is applicable because limn→+∞ fn
and all fn are bounded below].
As a consequence of their continuity with respect to non-decreasing sequences [E5], upper expectations also
satisfy the following countable sub-additivity property.
Proposition4. Consider any non-empty setY , anyL b (Y )⊆D ⊆L (Y ) and any upper expectation E onD . Then
E
 ∑
n∈N0
fn

≤
∑
n∈N0
E( fn ) for any sequence { fn}n∈N0 of non-negative variables inL b (Y ).
Proof. Consider the sequence {gn}n∈N0 of non-negative variables defined by gn :=
∑n
i=0 fi for all n ∈ N0. Then,
{gn}n∈N0 is non-decreasing because { fn}n∈N0 is non-negative. Moreover, it is clear that {gn}n∈N0 converges point-
wise to
∑
n∈N0
fn . Hence, we can apply E5 to find that
E
∑
n∈N0
fn

= lim
n→+∞
E(gn ) = limn→+∞
E

n∑
i=0
fi

E2
≤ lim
n→+∞
n∑
i=0
E( fi ) =
∑
n∈N0
E( fn ),
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where the limit on the right hand side of the inequality exists because all E( fn ) arenon-negative as a consequence
of E7.
Finally, the following proposition shows that for afinite setY , the continuity axiomE5 can in fact be replaced
by a much simpler property.
Proposition 5. For any finite non-empty set Y and anyL b (Y ) ⊆D ⊆L (Y ), an extended real-valued map E on
D is an upper expectation if and only if it satisfies E1–E4 and
E13. (+∞)E( f ) = E
 
(+∞) f

for all non-negative f ∈L b (Y ).
Proof. We first prove the direct implication. So consider any upper expectation E on D and any non-negative
f ∈ L b (Y ). Then observe that {n f }n∈N is a non-decreasing sequence in L (Y ) that converges pointwise to
(+∞) f [because of the convention that (+∞)0= 0]. Hence,
E
 
(+∞) f

= E

lim
n→+∞
n f

E12
= lim
n→+∞
E(n f )
E3
= lim
n→+∞
nE( f ) = (+∞)E( f ),
where we once more used the convention that (+∞)0 = 0 for the last step, together with the fact that E( f ) ≥ 0
because of E7.
To prove the converse implication, consider any extended real-valued map E on D that satisfies E1–E4 and
E13. Let { fn}n∈N0 be a non-decreasing sequence of non-negative variables in L b (Y ) and let f := limn→+∞ fn .
We show that limn→+∞E( fn ) = E( f ). Because { fn}n∈N0 is non-decreasing, we have that fn ≤ fn+1 ≤ f for all
n ∈N0. Then it follows fromE4 [whichwe are allowed to use because f and all fn are non-negative and therefore
bounded below] that E( fn )≤ E( fn+1)≤ E( f ) for all n ∈N0. Hence, limn→+∞E( fn ) exists and limn→+∞E( fn )≤ E( f ).
To show that the converse inequality holds, let A := {y ∈Y : f (y ) = +∞} and consider the following two cases.
If E(IA) = 0, we have that
E( f ) = E
 
(+∞)IA + f IAc
 E2
≤ E
 
(+∞)IA

+E( f IAc )
E13
= (+∞)E(IA) +E( f IAc ) = E( f IAc ). (2)
Because f IAc is real-valued [it cannot be −∞ because it is non-negative] and Y is finite, f IAc is a gamble and
{ fn IAc }n∈N0 converges uniformly to f IAc . { fn IAc }n∈N0 is moreover also a sequence of gambles because its ele-
ments are non-negative and are bounded from above by the gamble f IAc . Hence, it follows from E11 that
E( f IAc ) = lim
n→+∞
E( fn IAc )≤ lim
n→+∞
E( fn ),
where we used the non-negativity of { fn}n∈N0 and E4 in the last step. Together with Equation (2), this then leads
to the desired inequality.
If E(IA) 6= 0, we have that E(IA)> 0 because of E7. Furthermore, all fn are non-negative, and therefore
E( fn )
E4
≥ E( fn IA)
E4
≥ E

inf
y ∈A
fn (y )

IA

E9,E13
=

inf
y ∈A
fn (y )

E(IA) for all n ∈N0. (3)
Since { fn}n∈N0 converges to +∞ on A and A is moreover finite [sinceY is], we have that limn→+∞ infy ∈A fn (y ) =
+∞. This implies, together with E(IA) > 0 and (3), that limn→+∞E( fn ) = +∞. Hence, the desired inequality
follows.
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An Alternative Characterisation using Coherence
The axioms inDefinition 1 are rather abstract, particularly because the concept of infinity plays such a prom-
inent role in them. Walley [21] avoids this issue by only considering upper expectations—which he calls upper
previsions—on gambles, that is, bounded real-valued variables. This allows him to give upper expectations a
clear behavioural interpretation in terms of attitudes towards gambling [9, 21]. Concretely, the upper expecta-
tionE( f ) for any f ∈L (Y ) then represents a subject’s infimumselling price for the gamble f . This interpretation
in turn leads to a notion of rationality that he calls coherence.
Definition2. Consider any non-empty setY and anymap E on the linear spaceL (Y ) of all gambles onY . Then
E is called a coherent upper prevision if it is real-valued and satisfies the following three coherence axioms [21,
Definition 2.3.3]:
C1. E( f )≤ sup f for all f ∈L (Y );
C2. E( f + g )≤ E( f ) +E(g ) for all f ,g ∈L (Y );
C3. E(λ f ) =λE( f ) for all λ ∈R>0 and f ∈L (Y ).
One can easily show [21, Section 2.6.1] that the coherence axiomsC1–C3 imply the following additional prop-
erties, with E( f ) :=−E(− f ) for all f ∈L (Y ):
C4. f ≤ g ⇒ E( f )≤ E(g ) for all f ,g ∈L (Y );
C5. inf f ≤ E( f )≤ E( f )≤ sup f for all f ∈L (Y );
C6. E( f +µ) = E( f ) +µ for all real µ and all f ∈L (Y );
C7. limn→+∞ sup | f − fn |= 0⇒ limn→+∞ |E( f )−E( fn )|= 0 for any sequence { fn}n∈N0 inL (Y ).
Now, in order to use coherent upper previsions as local uncertainty models in a game-theoretic framework, we
need to extend their domain to at least the setL b (Y ) of all bounded below extended real-valued variables, and
in some cases to all ofL (Y ). We propose the following step-wise approach.
Consider any non-empty set Y and anyL (Y ) ⊆ D ⊆L (Y ). Furthermore, for any f ∈L (Y ) and any c ∈R,
let f ∧c be the variable defined by f ∧c (y ) :=min{ f (y ), c } for all y ∈ Y . Consider now the following continuity
property for an extended real-valued map E onD whose restriction toL (Y ) is a coherent upper prevision:
E14. E( f ) = limc→+∞ E( f
∧c ) for all f ∈D ∩L b (Y ).
Axiom E14 is called ‘continuity with respect to upper cuts’ (also called ‘bounded-above support’). The limit
on the right hand side exists, because f ∧c ∈ L (Y ) is non-decreasing in c ∈ R and E—or rather, its restriction
to L (Y )—satisfies C4. Similar to what we did with E6, property E14 can be used to (uniquely) extend a co-
herent upper prevision on L (Y ) to L b (Y ). Indeed, let E be any coherent upper prevision on L (Y ) and let
EE14 :L b (Y )→R be defined by
EE14( f ) := lim
c→+∞
E( f ∧c ) for all f ∈L b (Y ),
where the right hand side is well-defined because f ∧c ∈L (Y ) for all c ∈R and E satisfies C4 [which implies the
existence of the limit]. Then EE14 is an extension of E:
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Proposition 6. Consider any non-empty set Y and let E be any coherent upper prevision onL (Y ). Then EE14 is
an extension of E that satisfies E14.
Proof. EE14 is an extension of E because, for any gamble f ∈ L (Y ), we have that f
∧c = f for all c ∈ R such that
c ≥ sup f , and hence, EE14( f ) = limc→+∞ E( f ∧c ) = E( f ). That EE14 satisfies E14 now follows immediately from its
definition.
Our next result shows, for finiteY , that this extension EE14 is an upper expectation onL b (Y ) and, moreover,
that the restriction toL b (Y ) of any upper expectation is the extension EE14 of some coherent upper prevision E
onL (Y ).
Proposition 7. Consider any finite non-empty set Y and any extended real-valued map E′ onD , withL b (Y ) ⊆
D ⊆L (Y ). Then E′ is an upper expectation if and only if there is some coherent upper prevision E onL (Y ) such
that EE14 coincides with E
′ onL b (Y ).
The proof of this result is based on the following two lemmas.
Lemma 8. Consider any finite non-empty set Y , anyL b (Y ) ⊆ D ⊆L (Y ) and any extended real-valued map E
onD whose restriction toL (Y ) is a coherent upper prevision. Then E satisfies E12 if and only if it satisfies E14.
Proof. In order to prove the direct implication, consider any f ∈L b (Y ) =D ∩L b (Y ) and any non-decreasing
sequence {cn }n∈N0 of reals such that limn→+∞ cn = +∞. Then clearly { f
∧cn }n∈N0 is non-decreasing in L b (Y )
and converges to f . Hence, E12 implies that limn→+∞E( f
∧cn ) = E( f ). Furthermore, for any n ,m ∈N0 such that
m > n , we clearly have that f ∧cn ≤ f ∧c ≤ f ∧cm for all c ∈R such that cn ≤ c ≤ cm . Due to C4 [which we can apply
because the restriction of E toL (Y ) is a coherent upper prevision and because f ∧c is a gamble for all c ∈R], this
also implies that E( f ∧cn )≤ E( f ∧c )≤ E( f ∧cm ) for all c ∈R such that cn ≤ c ≤ cm . Since this holds for any n ,m ∈N0
such thatm > n , it follows that limc→+∞ E( f
∧c ) = limn→+∞E( f
∧cn ) = E( f ), where the last equality follows from
our earlier considerations.
To see that the converse implication holds, fix any non-decreasing sequence { fn}n∈N0 in L b (Y ) and let
f := limn→+∞ fn ∈ L b (Y ). Then, for any c ∈ R, { f
∧c
n }n∈N0 is a non-decreasing sequence in L (Y ) that clearly
converges pointwise to f ∧c ∈L (Y ). Moreover, since f ∧c is a real-valued function on afinite setY , the sequence
{ f ∧cn }n∈N0 converges uniformly to f
∧c . Hence, we have that
E( f )
E14
= lim
c→+∞
E( f ∧c )
C7
= lim
c→+∞
lim
n→+∞
E( f ∧cn )
C4
= sup
c∈R
sup
n∈N0
E( f ∧cn ) = sup
n∈N0
sup
c∈R
E( f ∧cn )
C4
= lim
n→+∞
sup
c∈R
E( f ∧cn )
C4
= lim
n→+∞
lim
c→+∞
E( f ∧cn )
E14
= lim
n→+∞
E( fn ).
Lemma9. Consider any finite non-empty setY , anyL b (Y )⊆D ⊆L (Y ) and any extended real-valuedmapE on
D . If the restriction of E toL (Y ) is a coherent upper prevision and E satisfies E12, then E is an upper expectation.
Proof. Assume that the restriction of E to L (Y ) is a coherent upper prevision and E satisfies E12. That E1
holds, follows immediately from C5. To prove E2, consider any two f ,g ∈ L b (Y ) and the corresponding non-
decreasing sequences { f ∧n}n∈N0 and {g
∧n}n∈N0 inL (Y ). Thendue toE12, limn→+∞E( f
∧n ) = E( f ) and limn→+∞E(g
∧n ) =
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E(g ). Moreover, { f ∧n + g ∧n}n∈N0 is also a non-decreasing sequence inL (Y ) and clearly limn→+∞( f
∧n + g ∧n ) =
f + g ∈L b (Y ), which again implies by E12 that limn→+∞E( f
∧n + g ∧n ) = E( f + g ). All together, we have that
E( f + g ) = lim
n→+∞
E( f ∧n + g ∧n )
C2
≤ lim
n→+∞

E( f ∧n ) +E(g ∧n )

= E( f ) +E(g ),
which concludes the proof of E2.
Property E3 can be proved in a similar way. Consider any λ ∈R>0 and any f ∈L b (Y ). Note that {λ f
∧n}n∈N0
is a non-decreasing sequence [because λ> 0] inL (Y ) that converges pointwise to λ f ∈L b (Y ). Hence,
E(λ f )
E12
= lim
n→+∞
E(λ f ∧n )
C3
= lim
n→+∞
λE( f ∧n )
E12
= λE( f ).
To prove E4, consider any two f ,g ∈ L b (Y ) such that f ≤ g , and the corresponding non-decreasing se-
quences { f ∧n }n∈N0 and {g
∧n}n∈N0 inL (Y ). Clearly, f
∧n ≤ g ∧n for all n ∈N0 and therefore E( f
∧n )≤ E(g ∧n ) by C4.
Hence, limn→+∞E( f
∧n ) ≤ limn→+∞E(g
∧n ) and therefore, because of E12, also E( f ) ≤ E(g ). Finally, property E5
follows immediately from E12.
Proof of Proposition 7. First assume that E′ is an upper expectation. We then let E be the restriction of E′ to
L (Y ). E trivially satisfies C1–C3 because E′ is an upper expectation, and E is real-valued because E′ satisfies
E7. Hence, E is a coherent upper prevision. Moreover, since E′ satisfies E12 because of Proposition 3, Lemma 8
implies that it also satisfies E14. Hence,
E′( f ) = lim
c→+∞
E′( f ∧c ) = lim
c→+∞
E( f ∧c ) = EE14( f ) for all f ∈L b (Y ),
where the second step follows from the fact that E is the restriction of E′ toL (Y ) and because f ∧c ∈ L (Y ) for
all c ∈R, and where the last step follows from the definition of EE14.
For the converse implication, we assume that there is some coherent upper prevision E onL (Y ) such that
EE14 coincides with E
′ on L b (Y ). Now recall from Proposition 6 that EE14 is an extension of E that satisfies E14.
Since EE14 coincides with E
′ on L b (Y ), this implies that E
′ satisfies E14 and that the restriction of E′ to L (Y )
is equal to E and therefore a coherent upper prevision. Then, by Lemma 8, E′ satisfies E12, which by Lemma 9
implies that E′ is an upper expectation.
An important consequence of this alternative characterisation for an upper expectation is that the restriction
of an upper expectation toL b (Y ) is uniquely determined by its values on the domainL (Y ) of all gambles. This
allows us to justify the use of upper expectations onL b (Y )—and therefore the use of these as local uncertainty
models further on—from amore conventional imprecise probability point of view, by combining coherence on
gambles with E14 [16]. The same can not be said about the values of our upper expectations onL (Y ) \L b (Y )
though. Ifwe alsowant these values to beuniquely determinedby the values on the gambles,we canadditionally
impose E6. This is made explicit in our next result, where we will use, for any coherent upper prevision E on
L (Y ), the notation Eext to denote themap [EE14]E6 that extends E toL b (Y ) using E14, and subsequently toL (Y )
using E6. Note that Eext is well-definedbecause EE14 is an upper expectation according to Proposition 7. It should
moreover be clear that Eext is also an extension of E; this can be checked using Propositions 6, 7 and 2.
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Proposition 10. Consider any finite non-empty set Y , any extended real-valued map E′ on L (Y ) and let E be
the restriction of E′ toL (Y ). Then the following are equivalent:
i. E′ is an upper expectation onL (Y ) that satisfies E6.
ii. E is a coherent upper prevision such that E′ = Eext.
iii. E is a coherent upper prevision and E′ satisfies E6 and E14.
Proof. i⇒ ii. Assume that E′ is an upper expectation onL (Y ) that satisfies E6. Then, according to Proposition 7,
there is a coherent upper prevision E∗ onL (Y ) such that E′( f ) = E∗
E14
( f ) for all f ∈L b (Y ). Then, since E
∗
E14
is an
extension of E∗ [due to Proposition 6] and since E′ is an extension of E, we have that E∗ = E. On the on hand, this
already implies that E is indeed a coherent upper prevision. On the other hand, it implies that E′( f ) = E∗
E14
( f ) =
EE14( f ) for all f ∈L b (Y ). Note that EE14 is therefore an upper expectation onL b (Y ) [because E
′ was assumed to
be anupper expectation onL (Y )], which, due to Proposition 2, implies that Eext is an extension of EE14 satisfying
E6. Hence, we have that E′( f ) = EE14( f ) = Eext( f ) for all f ∈L b (Y ). Since both E
′ and Eext satisfy E6, it then also
follows that E′( f ) = limc→−∞E
′( f ∨c ) = limc→−∞ Eext( f
∨c ) = Eext( f ) for all f ∈L (Y ).
ii ⇒ iii. Assume that E is a coherent upper prevision such that E′ = Eext. Then, due to Proposition 7, EE14
is an upper expectation on L b (Y ), which, by Proposition 2 implies that Eext—and therefore, also E
′—satisfies
E6. To see that E′ moreover satisfies E14, it suffices to recall that E′ = Eext is an extension of EE14 [because of
Proposition 2] and that EE14 satisfies E14 [because of Proposition 6].
iii⇒ i. Assume that E is a coherent upper prevision and E′ satisfies E6 and E14. Then it suffices to prove that
E′ is an upper expectation onL (Y ), which can readily be inferred by combining Lemma 8 and Lemma 9.
So if we assume our upper expectations to satisfy E6, we can justify their use on the entire domain L (Y )
by combining Walley’s behavioural interpretation [16] with E6 and E14. For the local uncertainty models fur-
ther on—which will simply be upper expectations on L (X ) withX a finite state space—, we would therefore
typically be inclined to adopt this assumption, as we do in [16]. Moreover, it will turn out that imposing E6 on
the local models is necessary if we want to guarantee compatibility of local and global models; see Section 6.
Nonetheless, we will generally not impose E6 on our local models here, because the current paper focusses on
themathematical properties of global game-theoretic upper expectations, which—apart from the compatibility
with local models— are not affected by this additional continuity axiom. It can easily be seen that this is a con-
sequence of the fact that the global game-theoretic upper expectationwill only depend on the restrictions of the
local models toL b (X ).
3. Game-theoretic Upper Expectations
When mathematically modelling an uncertain process, one typically starts out with information about its
local behaviour, that is, how its state Xk will evolve from one time instant to the next. We will represent this
information using so-called ‘local’ upper expectations; upper expectations onL (X )whereX is the finite state
space of the process. Most often, one is interested in more general behaviour of the process though, which
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confronts us with the question of how to combine the individual local assessments—represented by local upper
expectations in our case—to obtain a single global uncertainty model. We consider one possible way of doing
so; using the game-theoretic approach proposed by Shafer and Vovk. We will leave out most of the contextual
discussion surrounding the followingdefinitions. Formore details, we refer the interested reader to [5, 10, 11, 16].
As explained in the introduction, we consider sequences X1,X2, ...,Xn , ... of uncertain states that take val-
ues in a finite state space X . We call any finite string x1:n := (x1, ..., xn ) ∈ X1:n := X
n of possible state values
a situation and we denote the set of all situations by X ∗ := ∪n∈N0X1:n . In particular, the unique empty string
x1:0, denoted by , is called the initial situation, and X1:0 := {}. In order to model the local behaviour of an
uncertain process, we attach to each situation x1:n ∈ X ∗ an upper expectation Qx1:n on L (X ). Such an upper
expectation Qx1:n—which we will call a local upper expectation—represents a subject’s beliefs about what the
process’ next state will be, given that it was in the states x1 · · ·xn at times k = 1 through k = n . For instance, if we
adopt a behavioural interpretation, the upper expectation Qx1:n ( f ) for some f ∈L (X ) is the subject’s infimum
selling price for the gamble f (Xn+1) that takes the value f (x ) if Xn+1 = x for any x ∈ X , given that he observed
the history X1 = x1 · · ·Xn = xn . However, the local upper expectations could equally well be interpreted in terms
of upper envelopes of linear expectations. We do not enforce any interpretation for the local models Qx1:n ; we
simply assume that they are maps onL (X ) that satisfy E1–E5. A collection of local upper expectations Qs , one
for every s ∈X ∗, is called an imprecise probability tree.
In order to describe uncertain processes on amore global level, wewill use the notion of a pathω; an infinite
sequence of state values. The set of all paths is called the sample space Ω :=X N. For any pathω ∈ Ω, the initial
sequence that consists of its first n state values is a situation inX1:n that is denoted byω
n . The n-th state value
is denoted by ωn ∈ X . A collection of paths A ⊆ Ω is called an event. With any situation x1:n , we associate
the cylinder event Γ (x1:n ) := {ω ∈ Ω :ωn = x1:n }: the set of all paths ω ∈ Ω that ‘go through’ the situation x1:n .
Sometimes, when it is clear from the context, we will also use the notation ‘x1:n ’ to denote the set Γ (x1:n ). For
example, we will use Ix1:n as a shorthand notation for IΓ (x1:n ). Moreover, for any two extended real variables g ,h ∈
L (Ω) and any situation s ∈X ∗, we use g ≤s f to denote that g (ω)≤ f (ω) for allω∈ Γ (s ), and similarly for ≥s ,>s
and <s .
We will distinguish between local variables and global variables. A local variable is a variable on the set X
of all state values, whereas a global variable is a variable on the set Ω of all paths. For any natural k ≤ ℓ, we use
Xk :ℓ to denote the global variable that assumes the value Xk :ℓ(ω) := (ωk , ...,ωℓ) on the path ω ∈ Ω. As such, the
state Xk = Xk :k at any discrete time k can also be regarded as a global variable. For anym ,n ∈ N and any map
f :X n → R, we will write f (Xm :m+n−1) to denote the extended real global variable defined by f (Xm :m+n−1) :=
f ◦ Xm :m+n−1. In particular, we can associate a global variable f (Xn ) with any local variable f :X → R and any
index n ∈N. We denote the set of all global extended real variables by V :=L (Ω), and similarly for Vb :=L b (Ω)
and V := L (Ω). Our aim now is to combine the local upper expectations Qs to construct a global uncertainty
model, in the form of an upper expectation on the global variablesV (and conditional on the situationsX ∗). A
crucial tool to do so, is the notion of a supermartingale; a special type of process.
Any mapP onX ∗ is called a process. An extended real(-valued) processP is called bounded below if there
is someM ∈R such thatP (s )≥M for all s ∈X ∗. Furthermore, with any situation s ∈X ∗ and any extended real
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process P , we can associate the local variableP (s ·) ∈ L (X ) defined by P (s ·)(x ) := P (s x ) for all x ∈ X . The
extended real variables liminfP ∈V and limsupP ∈V, will be defined by
liminfP (ω) := liminf
n→+∞
P (ωn ) and limsupP (ω) := limsup
n→+∞
P (ωn )
for allω∈Ω. If liminfP = limsupP , we denote their common value by limP .
For a given impreciseprobability tree, a supermartingaleM is anextended real process such thatQs (M (s ·))≤
M (s ) for all s ∈X ∗. So a supermartingale is an extended real process that, according to the local models Qs , is
expected to decrease. When adopting a behavioural interpretation, supermartingales can be seen to represent
betting strategies that are allowed by our subject. Roughly speaking, the condition that Qs (M (s ·))≤M (s ) with
s = x1:n thenmeans that our subject— for the sake of simplicity, we ignore the subtlety about the extended real-
valuedness—is willing to receive the priceM (x1:n ) for giving away the uncertain variableM (x1:nXn+1) that will
be evaluated in the next time instant. Hence, if we take him up on his commitments, we can pay himM (x1:n )
to receiveM (x1:nXn+1). The next time instant, if the state of the process turns out to be xn+1 ∈ X , we obtain
the—possibly negative—payoff M (x1:n+1). By repeating this procedure, we find that the supermartingale M
represents a possible evolution of our capital when wewould gamble against the subject. We will denote the set
of all bounded below supermartingales for a given imprecise probability tree byMb.
In the framework of Shafer and Vovk, the role of our subject above is taken up by a player called ‘Forecaster’,
whereas supermartingales represent possible betting strategies for a second player called ‘Skeptic’. Given this
game-theoretic setting, they consider the following question: How can Skeptic use Forecaster’s assessments
to determine selling and buying prices for a gamble f whose uncertain payoff depends on the process’ state at
multiple or even an infinite number of time instances? Shafer and Vovk argue that Skeptic should certainly agree
on selling f for a price α such that, if Skeptic starts with an initial capital α and gambles in an appropriate way
against Forecaster, he will end up with a higher capital than the payoff f (ω) corresponding to f irrespectively of
the pathω∈Ω taken by the process. Indeed, selling f for a price αmeans that Skeptic receives α− f . If Skeptic is
then able to turn the initial capitalα into a final capital K such thatK (ω)≥ f (ω) for all pathsω ∈Ω, his net payoff
K − f is non-negative for allω. Hence, Skeptic should accept the transaction of selling f for α. The infimum of
these prices α is what Shafer and Vovk then call the (global) game-theoretic upper expectation of f .
More formally, given an imprecise probability tree consisting of local upper expectations Qs for all s ∈ X
∗,
we use its compatible set of bounded below supermartingalesMb to define the corresponding (global) game-
theoretic upper expectation EV as follows.
Definition 3. For any imprecise probability tree, the corresponding (global) game-theoretic upper expectation
EV(·|·) :V×X
∗→R is defined by
EV ( f |s ) := inf

M (s ) :M ∈Mb and liminfM ≥s f
	
for all f ∈V and all s ∈X ∗. (4)
The game-theoretic lower expectation EV(·|·) : V ×X
∗ → R is defined by the conjugacy relation EV( f |s ) :=
−EV(− f |s ) for all f ∈ V and all s ∈ X
∗. We will show later in Corollary 24 that, for any s ∈ X ∗, the map
EV(· |s ) :V→R satisfies E1–E5, which justifies callingEV anupper expectation. Mimicking the link between tradi-
tional expectations andprobabilities,wecall PV(A|s ) := EV(IA |s ), for anyA ⊆Ω andany s ∈X
∗, the game-theoretic
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upper probability of the event A conditional on the situation s . Similarly, we call PV(A|s ) := EV (IA |s ) the game-
theoretic lower probability of A conditional on s . We will also let EV ( f ) := EV ( f |) and EV ( f ) := EV ( f |) for all
f ∈V.
Note that EV does not depend on the values of the local models Qs onL (X ) \L b (X ), because the infimum
in Definition 3 is taken over supermartingales that are bounded below. This confirms our earlier claim in Sec-
tion 2, where we said that, as far as the global upper expectation EV is concerned, we can assumewithout loss of
generality that the local models Qs additionally satisfy Shafer and Vovk’s axioms E2’–E4’. Our reason for adopt-
ing this particular definition, where only bounded below supermartingales are considered, will be discussed in
Section 8. Intuitively, however, one could interpret this assumption as a concretisation of the fact that a subject
(e.g. Skeptic) cannot borrow an infinite or even unbounded amount of money.
4. Basic Properties of Game-Theoretic Upper Expectations
We start by establishing somebasic, yet essential properties of game-theoretic upper expectations. Themain
ones are an extended version of coherence, partial compatibility with the local upper expectations and a law of
iterated upper expectations. Most of these results are not entirely new and were already proved in a slightly dif-
ferent setting; our contribution then consists in adapting their proofs to our setting. We start with the following
two, rather abstract lemmas about supermartingales.
Lemma 11. Consider anyM ∈Mb and any situation s ∈X
∗. Then
M (s )≥ inf
ω∈Γ (s )
limsupM (ω)≥ inf
ω∈Γ (s )
liminfM (ω).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of [4, Lemma 1], where instead real supermartingales were used. SinceM is
a bounded below supermartingale, we have that Qs (M (s ·)) ≤M (s ), which by E7 implies that infx∈X M (s x ) ≤
M (s ). Hence, sinceX is finite, there is at least one x ∈ X such thatM (s x ) ≤M (s ). Repeating this argument
over and over again, leads us to the conclusion that there is someω ∈ Γ (s ) such that limsupn→+∞M (ω
n )≤M (s )
and therefore also infω∈Γ (s ) limsupM (ω)≤M (s ). The rest of the proof is now trivial.
Lemma 12. Consider any countable collection {Mn}n∈N0 of supermartingales that have a common lower bound,
and any countable collection of non-negative real numbers {λn}n∈N0 such that
∑
n∈N0
λn is a real number λ. Then
M :=
∑
n∈N0
λnMn is again a bounded below supermartingale. If, moreover, allMn are non-negative, then so
isM .
Proof. We only prove the first statement, as the second is then trivially true. Since allMn have a common lower
bound, say B ∈ R, the processesM n − B will be non-negative and therefore, because all reals λn are also non-
negative, the sum
∑
n∈N0
λn [Mn (s )−B ] exists and is non-negative for all s ∈X
∗. Then, in order to see thatM is
well-defined, note that
∑
n∈N0
λn [Mn (s )−B ] +λB = lim
n→+∞
 n∑
i=0
λi [Mi (s )−B ] +
n∑
i=0
λiB

= lim
n→+∞
n∑
i=0

λi [Mi (s )−B ] +λiB

=
∑
n∈N0
λnMn (s ) =:M (s ), (5)
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for all s ∈ X ∗, where the first step takes into account that λB is real and the third step takes into account that
all λi and B are real. The equality above, together with the non-negativity of
∑
n∈N0
λn [Mn (s )−B ] immediately
shows thatM is bounded below by the real λB . It also shows that M is a supermartingale. Indeed, for any
s ∈X ∗, we find that
Qs (M (s ·))
(5)
= Qs
 ∑
n∈N0
λn [Mn (s ·)−B ] +λB

E8
= Qs
 ∑
n∈N0
λn [Mn (s ·)−B ]

+λB
≤
∑
n∈N0
Qs

λn [Mn (s ·)−B ]

+λB
E9
=
∑
n∈N0
λnQs (Mn (s ·)−B ) +λB
E8
=
∑
n∈N0
λn

Qs (Mn (s ·))−B

+λB=
∑
n∈N0
λnQs (Mn (s ·))≤
∑
n∈N0
λnMn (s ) =M (s ),
where we were allowed to apply E8 and E9 because
∑
n∈N0
λn [Mn (s ·) − B ], all Mn (s ·) − B and all Mn (s ·) are
bounded below, where the first inequality followed from Proposition 4 and where the last inequality followed
from the non-negativity of all λn and the fact that allM n are supermartingales.
The following result states that EV satisfies a version of the coherence axioms for global extended real vari-
ables. A first version of the result was stated in [10, Chapter 8], yet, our proof is very similar to that of [4, Prop.
14]: we adapt it here to the fact that our bounded below supermartingales take values in R rather than R.
Proposition13. For all extended real variables f ,g ∈V, allλ ∈R≥0, allµ ∈Randall situations s ∈X ∗,EV satisfies
V1. EV( f |s )≤ supω∈Γ (s ) f (ω);
V2. EV( f + g |s )≤ EV ( f |s ) +EV (g |s );
V3. EV(λ f |s ) =λEV( f |s ).
V4. f ≤s g ⇒ EV( f |s )≤ EV(g |s );
V5. infω∈Γ (s ) f (ω)≤ EV( f |s )≤ EV( f |s )≤ supω∈Γ (s ) f (ω);
V6. EV( f +µ|s ) = EV( f |s ) +µ.
Proof. V1. If supω∈Γ (s ) f (ω) = +∞, the inequality is trivially satisfied. If this is not the case, consider any real
M ≥ supω∈Γ (s ) f (ω) and the real processM that assumes the constant valueM . Then clearlyM is a bounded
below supermartingale andmoreover liminfM (ω) =M ≥ f (ω) for allω∈ Γ (s ). Hence, Definition 3 implies that
EV( f |s )≤M (s ) =M . Since this is true for every realM ≥ supω∈Γ (s ) f (ω), V1 follows.
V2. If either EV( f |s ) or EV(g |s ) equals+∞, then the inequality is trivially true. So suppose that EV( f |s )<+∞
and EV(g |s ) < +∞ and consider any real c1 > EV ( f |s ) and any real c2 > EV (g |s ). Then there are two bounded
below supermartingalesM1 andM2 such thatM1(s ) ≤ c1 andM2(s ) ≤ c2 and moreover liminfM1 ≥s f and
liminfM2 ≥s g . Now consider the extended real process M := M1 +M2. Then M is a bounded below su-
permartingale because of Lemma 12, which we can apply becauseM1 andM2 are both bounded below and
hence have a common lower bound [note that the countable sum in Lemma 12 can be turned into a finite
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sum by setting all remaining supermartingales equal to zero]. Moreover, we will show that liminf(M1 +M2) ≥
liminfM1 + liminfM2 and therefore that liminfM ≥s f + g , which, by Definition 3, implies that EV( f + g |s ) ≤
M (s ) =M1(s )+M2(s )≤ c1+c2. Since this then holds for any real c1 > EV ( f |s ) and any real c2 > EV (g |s ), it follows
that EV ( f + g |s )≤ EV ( f |s ) +EV(g |s ).
So consider any ω ∈ Ω and any real α1 and α2 such that liminfM1(ω) > α1 and liminfM2(ω) > α2. This is
always possible becauseM1 andM2 are bounded below. Then there are two natural numbers N1 and N2 such
thatM1(ω
n1 ) ≥ α1 andM2(ω
n2 ) ≥ α2 for all n1 ≥ N1 and all n2 ≥ N2. Hence, we have thatM1(ω
n ) +M2(ω
n ) ≥
α1+α2 for all n ≥max{N1,N2}, implying that liminf(M1+M2)(ω)≥ α1+α2. Since this holds for any real α1 and
α2 such that liminfM1(ω)>α1 and liminfM2(ω)>α2, we indeed find that liminf(M1+M2)(ω)≥ liminfM1(ω)+
liminfM2(ω).
V3. For λ ∈ R>0, it suffices to note thatM is a bounded below supermartingale such that liminfM ≥s f if
and only if λM is a bounded below supermartingale such that liminfλM ≥s λ f . If λ = 0, then λEV( f |s ) = 0
because (+∞) · 0= (−∞) · 0= 0. To see that also EV (λ f |s ) = 0, start by noting that λ f = 0 and hence, because of
V1, EV(λ f |s ) ≤ 0. That EV(λ f |s ) < 0 is impossible, follows from Lemma 11 and Definition 3. Hence, we indeed
have that EV (λ f |s ) = 0.
V4. Consider any two f ,g ∈V such that f ≤s g . Then for anyM ∈Mb such that liminfM ≥s g , we also have
that liminfM ≥s f , and hence, by Definition 3, EV ( f |s )≤ EV(g |s ).
V5. Thefirst and third inequality follow trivially fromV1and thedefinitionof the conjugate lower expectation
EV . To prove the second inequality, assume ex absurdo that EV( f |s )> EV( f |s ). Then 0> EV ( f |s )−EV( f |s ) which,
by V2 and the definition of the conjugate lower expectation EV , implies that 0> EV( f +(− f )|s ). Since, according
to our convention, the extended real variable f +(− f ) only assumes values in {0,+∞}, we have that f +(− f )≥ 0
and therefore, by V4 and V3, that EV( f + (− f )|s )≥ EV (0|s ) = 0. This is a contradiction.
V6. For anyM ∈Mb such that liminfM ≥s f +µ, we have thatM −µ ∈Mb because of E8 and moreover
liminf(M −µ) ≥s f . Hence, EV ( f |s ) ≤ M (s )−µ and therefore also EV ( f |s ) +µ ≤ M (s )−µ+µ =M (s ). Since
this holds for anyM ∈Mb such that liminfM ≥s f +µ, we have that EV ( f |s ) +µ≤ EV ( f +µ|s ). By applying this
inequality to f ′ = f +µ and µ′ =−µ, we also find that EV ( f +µ|s )−µ≤ EV ( f |s ).
In order to formulate our next result, we require the concept of an n-measurable variable. For a givenn ∈N0,
we call a global variable f n-measurable if it is constant on the cylinder events Γ (x1:n ) for all x1:n ∈ X1:n , that
is, if f = f˜ (X1:n ) for some map f˜ on X n . We will then also use the notation f (x1:n ) for its constant value f (ω)
on all paths ω ∈ Γ (x1:n ). Similarly, for a global variable f that only depends on the n-th state Xn , we will use
f (xn ) to denote its constant value on the event {ω ∈ Ω :ωn = xn }. We call a global variable f ∈ V finitary if it is
n-measurable for some n ∈N0. With any situation x1:n ∈X
∗ and any (n + 1)-measurable extended real variable
f , we now associate a local variable f (x1:n ·) defined by f (x1:n ·)(xn+1) := f (x1:n+1) for all xn+1 ∈ X . On the other
hand, for any extended real processP , we will define the global variableP (X1:n ) :=P ◦X1:n that only depends
of the first n states, and is therefore finitary.
Our proof of Proposition 14 also requires the following additional notation and terminology. For any two
situations s , t ∈X ∗, wewrite that s ⊑ t , or equivalently that t ⊒ s , when every path that goes through t also goes
through s . In that case we say that s precedes t or that t follows s . When s ⊑ t and s 6= t , we write s ⊏ t and
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similarly for the relation ⊐. When neither s ⊑ t nor t ⊑ s , we say that s and t are incomparable.
Proposition 14 (Partial compatibility with local models). Consider any situation x1:n ∈ X
∗ and any (n + 1)-
measurable extended real variable f that is bounded below. Then,
EV( f |x1:n ) =Qx1:n ( f (x1:n ·)).
Proof. Our proof is similar to that of [4, Corollary 3]. Consider anyM ∈Mb such that liminfM ≥x1:n f . Then it
follows from Lemma 11 that, for all xn+1 ∈X ,
M (x1:n+1)≥ inf
ω∈Γ (x1:n+1)
liminfM (ω)≥ inf
ω∈Γ (x1:n+1)
f (ω) = f (x1:n+1).
Hence, we have thatM (x1:n ·)≥ f (x1:n ·), which implies by E4 and the supermartingale character ofM that
M (x1:n )≥Qx1:n (M (x1:n ·))≥Qx1:n ( f (x1:n ·)).
Since this holds for any M ∈ Mb such that liminfM ≥x1:n f , it follows from Definition 3 that EV( f |x1:n ) ≥
Qx1:n ( f (x1:n ·)). To see that the inequality is an equality, consider the extended real processM defined byM (s ) :=
Qx1:n ( f (x1:n ·)) for all s 6⊐ x1:n , andbyM (s ) := f (x1:n+1) for any s ∈X
∗ such that s ⊒ x1:n+1 for some xn+1 ∈X . Then
M is bounded below because f is bounded below and Qx1:n satisfies E7. It is also a supermartingale because
Qx1:n (M (x1:n ·)) =Qx1:n ( f (x1:n ·)) =M (x1:n ) and, for all s 6= x1:n , Qs (M (s ·)) =M (s ) because of E7 and the fact that
M (s ·) is constant and equal toM (s ). It is moreover easy to see that liminfM ≥x1:n f is guaranteed because f is
(n + 1)-measurable.
We will show later on that this compatibility can be extended to the entire domain of the local models Qs
provided that they additionally satisfy E6.
The following important result is an imprecise generalisation of thewell-known ‘lawof iterated expectations’.
The idea of the proof goes back to [10, Proposition 8.7], yet, our proof is more similar to that of [4, Theorem 16].
Theorem 15 (Law of iterated upper expectations). For any f ∈V and any x1:n ∈X
∗, we have that
EV( f |x1:n ) = EV

EV
 
f |x1:nXn+1
 x1:n .
Proof. Fix any f ∈ V and any x1:n ∈ X
∗. We first show that EV(EV ( f |x1:nXn+1)|x1:n ) ≤ EV ( f |x1:n ). If EV ( f |x1:n ) =
+∞, this is trivially satisfied. If not, then for any fixed real α> EV ( f |x1:n ) there is a bounded below supermartin-
galeM such thatM (x1:n ) ≤ α and liminfM ≥x1:n f . Then it is clear that, for all xn+1 ∈ X , liminfM ≥x1:n+1 f ,
and hence EV ( f |x1:n+1) ≤M (x1:n+1) by Definition 3. LetM
′ be the process that is equal toM for all situations
that precede x1:n or are incomparable with x1:n , and that is equal to the constant M (x1:n+1) for all situations
that follow x1:n+1 for some xn+1 ∈ X . Clearly, M ′ is again a bounded below supermartingale and, because of
the reasoning above, EV( f |x1:nXn+1) ≤ M (x1:nXn+1) =x1:n liminfM
′. Hence, it follows from Definition 3 that
EV(EV ( f |x1:nXn+1)|x1:n ) ≤ M
′(x1:n ) =M (x1:n ) ≤ α. Since this holds for any real α > EV( f |x1:n ), we indeed have
that EV (EV( f |x1:nXn+1)|x1:n )≤ EV ( f |x1:n ).
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We now prove the other inequality. Again, if EV(EV( f |x1:nXn+1)|x1:n ) = +∞ it trivially holds, so we can as-
sume it to be real or equal to −∞. Fix any real α > EV(EV ( f |x1:nXn+1)|x1:n ) and any ε ∈ R>0. Then there must
be a bounded below supermartingaleM such thatM (x1:n ) ≤ α and liminfM ≥x1:n EV( f |x1:nXn+1). Consider
any such bounded below supermartingale. Then for any xn+1 ∈ X , we have that liminfM ≥x1:n+1 EV ( f |x1:n+1),
which by Lemma 11 implies that M (x1:n+1) ≥ EV ( f |x1:n+1). Fix any xn+1 ∈ X . Then M (x1:n+1) is either real
or equal to +∞ because M is bounded below. If M (x1:n+1) is real, then since M (x1:n+1) ≥ EV( f |x1:n+1), it
follows from Definition 3 that there is a bounded below supermartingale Mx1:n+1 such that Mx1:n+1 (x1:n+1) ≤
M (x1:n+1) + ε and liminfMx1:n+1 ≥x1:n+1 f . IfM (x1:n+1) is +∞, letMx1:n+1 be the constant supermartingale that
is equal to +∞ everywhere. So, for all xn+1 ∈ X , we have found a bounded below supermartingale Mx1:n+1
such that Mx1:n+1 (x1:n+1) ≤ M (x1:n+1) + ε and liminfMx1:n+1 ≥x1:n+1 f . Let M
∗ be the process that is equal to
M +ε for all situations that precede or are incomparable with x1:n , and that is equal toMx1:n+1 for all situations
that follow x1:n+1 for some xn+1 ∈ X . Note that liminfM
∗ ≥x1:n f because, for each xn+1 ∈ X , we have that
liminfM ∗ =x1:n+1 liminfMx1:n+1 ≥x1:n+1 f . We moreover show thatM
∗ is a bounded below supermartingale.
The processM ∗ is clearly bounded belowbecauseM and allM x1:n+1 are bounded below andX is finite. Fur-
thermore, for any xn+1 ∈X , we have thatM
∗(x1:n+1) =Mx1:n+1 (x1:n+1)≤M (x1:n+1)+ε, implying thatM
∗(x1:n ·)≤
M (x1:n ·) +ε and therefore, by E4 and E8, that
Qx1:n (M
∗(x1:n ·))≤Qx1:n (M (x1:n ·) +ε) =Qx1:n (M (x1:n ·)) +ε≤M (x1:n ) +ε=M
∗(x1:n ).
Moreover, for all situations s 6⊒ x1:n , we have by E8 that Qs (M
∗(s ·)) =Qs (M (s ·)+ε) =Qs (M (s ·))+ε≤M (s )+ε=
M ∗(s ), and for all s ∈ X ∗ such that s ⊒ x1:n+1 for some xn+1 ∈ X , we have that Qs (M
∗(s ·)) = Qs (Mx1:n+1 (s ·)) ≤
Mx1:n+1 (s ) =M
∗(s ). All together, we have that Qs (M
∗(s ·)) ≤M ∗(s ) for all s ∈ X ∗, implying thatM ∗ is a super-
martingale that, as shown before, is bounded below.
Since liminfM ∗ ≥x1:n f andM
∗(x1:n ) =M (x1:n ) +ε ≤ α+ε, Definition 3 now implies that EV ( f |x1:n ) ≤ α+ε.
This holds for any ε ∈ R>0 and any real α > EV(EV( f |x1:nXn+1)|x1:n ), so we indeed conclude that EV ( f |x1:n ) ≤
EV(EV ( f |x1:nXn+1)|x1:n ).
Corollary 16. For any f ∈ Vb , the process P , defined by P (s ) := EV ( f |s ) for all s ∈ X
∗, is a bounded below
supermartingale.
Proof. Consider any f ∈Vb . ThenP is boundedbelowbecause f is boundedbelowandEV satisfiesV5. Moreover,
if for any s ∈ X ∗ we let EV ( f |s ·) be the (bounded below) local variable that assumes the value EV ( f |s x ) for all
x ∈X , then it follows from Proposition 14 and Theorem 15 that
Qx1:n (P (x1:n ·)) =Qx1:n
 
EV ( f |x1:n ·)

= EV
 
EV ( f |x1:nXn+1)|x1:n

= EV ( f |x1:n ) =P (x1:n ) for all x1:n ∈X
∗.
Hence,P is indeed a supermartingale, and therefore a bounded below supermartingale.
5. Equivalent definitions for E V
We start the current section by presenting two technical results that are essential for our further analysis
of Definition 3: Doob’s Convergence Theorem and Lévy’s Zero-one Law. Both of them also hold in a precise
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measure-theoretic context, but our results do not require any measurability conditions, nor do they require the
local models to be precise. The game-theoretic versions we present here are due to Shafer, Vovk and Takemura
[11, 12, 20]. However, since our framework slightly differs from theirs, wehave adapted their proofs to our setting.
Some of the involved arguments are rather lengthy and technical though, so we have chosen to relegate these
proofs to an appendix at the end of the paper.
To state the results, we require the following terminology. For any s ∈ X ∗, we say that a supermartingale
M ∈ Mb is an s -test supermartingale if it is non-negative and M (s ) = 1. If s = , we simply say it is a test
supermartingale. For any s ∈ X ∗, we say that an event A ⊆ Ω is strictly almost sure (s.a.s.) within Γ (s ) if there is
an s -test supermartingale that converges to+∞ on Γ (s )\A. In that case, we call the event Ac strictly null within
Γ (s ). If s =, we drop the ‘within’ and simply speak of ‘strictly almost sure’. For any two f ,g ∈V, we will use the
notation f ≥s g s.a.s.—and similarly for≤s ,>s and<s—to indicate that the event {ω∈Ω : f (ω)≥ g (ω)} is strictly
almost sure within Γ (s ).
It can easily be shown that an event A ⊆ Ω is strictly almost sure within Γ (s ) if and only PV (A
c |s ) = 0 or,
equivalently,4 if and only if PV (A|s ) = 1; we refer to [11, Proposition 8.4] for an illustration in the case where s =.
This is similar to the traditionalmeasure-theoretic definition of an almost sure event; that is, ameasurable event
with (measure-theoretic) probability one. In contrast with the measure-theoretic definition however, the game-
theoretic approach provides a clear behavioural interpretation for strictly null events A ⊆Ω: it says that there is
a strategy for Skeptic that allows him to start with a finite capital (in the situation s ) and become infinitely rich
on all pathsω∈ A (that moreover go through s ) without ever borrowingmoney.
Theorem 18 below establishes a version of Doob’s convergence law. It states that a bounded below super-
martingale converges to a real number strictly almost surely. This is somewhat intuitive (yet, not trivial at all):
since a supermartingale is bounded below and expected to decrease, one would expect it to converge to a real
number. We precede Theorem 18 with a technical result about the limit behaviour of the test supermartingales
that are involved in Theorem 18.
Proposition 17. Consider any supermartingaleM ∈Mb. IfM (s ) is real for some s ∈ X
∗, then there is a s -test
supermartingaleM ∗ that converges to +∞ on all pathsω ∈ Γ (s ) whereM does not converge to an extended real
number, and that converges to an extended real number on all pathsω ∈ Γ (s )whereM converges to a real number.
Theorem 18 (Doob’s Convergence Theorem). Consider any supermartingaleM ∈Mb. IfM (s ) is real for some
s ∈X ∗, thenM converges to a real number strictly almost surely within Γ (s ).
The following result, a version of Lévy’s zero-one law, captures (and extends) yet another intuitive idea: the
upper probability of an event A ⊆ Ω conditional on a situation ωn should (or, is expected to) converge to 1 as
n→+∞ ifω∈ A.
Theorem 19 (Lévy’s zero-one law). For any f ∈Vb and any s ∈X
∗, the event
A :=
¦
ω ∈Ω : liminf
n→+∞
EV( f |ω
n )≥ f (ω)
©
is strictly almost sure within Γ (s ).
4This follows from the fact that PV (A
c |s ) = EV (IAc |s ) = EV (1− IA |s ) = 1+ EV (−IA |s ) = 1− EV (IA |s ) = 1− PV (A|s ), using V6 for the third
equality.
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One of the major consequences of Doob’s convergence theorem and Lévy’s zero-one law is that they allow
us to draw some interesting conclusions about Definition 3. In particular, we can use them to show that the
resulting game-theoretic upper expectation is not impacted much by changes that concern the limit behaviour
of supermartingales and, more specifically, how this limit behaviour relates to the variable f at hand; see Pro-
position 20 and 21 below. As was the case for the previous results in this section, the ideas underlying the proofs
of the following results are due to Shafer, Vovk and Takemura [11, 12].
Our first result shows that, in Definition 3, we can restrict ourselves to the bounded below supermartingales
that converge within Γ (s ). That is, the limit inferior in Definition 3 can be replaced by a limit.
Proposition 20. For any f ∈V and any s ∈X ∗, we have that
EV( f |s ) = inf

M (s ) :M ∈Mb and limM ≥s f
	
,
where the condition limM ≥s f is taken to implicitly imply that limM exists within Γ (s ).
Proof. The inequality ‘≤’ is trivially satisfied since liminfM =s limM for any bounded below supermartingale
M such that the limit limM exists within Γ (s ). It remains to prove the other inequality. If EV ( f |s ) = +∞, this
is trivially satisfied. Otherwise, fix any real α > EV( f |s ). Then, due to Definition 3, there is a supermartingale
M ∈Mb such thatM (s ) ≤ α and liminfM ≥s f . BecauseM is bounded below and α is real,M (s ) is also real.
So, by Proposition 17, there is an s -test supermartingaleM ∗ that converges to +∞ on all pathsω ∈ Γ (s ) where
M does not converge in R and converges in R on all pathsω ∈ Γ (s ) whereM converges in R.
Fix any ε ∈R>0 and consider the processM
′ defined byM ′(t ) :=M (t ) +εM ∗(t ) for all situations t ⊒ s and
byM ′(t ) :=M (s ) +εM ∗(s ) ≤ α+ε for all situations t 6⊒ s . ThenM ′ is bounded below becauseM andM ∗ are
bounded below. Moreover, as we will now show, it is also a supermartingale. On the one hand, for all situations
t ⊒ s , we have that
Qt (M
′(t ·)) =Qt (M (t ·) +εM
∗(t ·))
E2, E3
≤ Qt (M (t ·)) +εQt (M
∗(t ·))≤M (t ) +εM ∗(t ) =M ′(t ),
where the second inequality follows from the fact thatM andM ∗ are bounded below supermartingales, and
from the positivity of ε. On the other hand, for all situations t 6⊒ s , it can easily be seen that the local variable
M ′(t ·) is equal to the constant M (s ) + εM ∗(s ) =M ′(t ). This constant is furthermore real because M ′(t ) is
bounded below andM (s ) + εM ∗(s ) ≤ α+ ε. Hence, due to E1: Qt (M
′(t ·)) =M ′(t ). So we can conclude that
M ′ is indeed a supermartingale and more specifically, a bounded below supermartingale. We also have that
liminfM ′ ≥s f because εM
∗ is non-negative and liminfM ≥s f . We will now show that, moreover, for all
ω∈ Γ (s ), this processM ′ converges in R.
For any ω ∈ Γ (s ), if M does not converge in R, M ∗ converges to +∞ and hence also M ′ because M is
bounded below and ε is positive. IfM does converge in R, it converges either to a real number or to +∞ (con-
vergence to−∞ is impossible because it is bounded below). IfM converges to a real number,M ∗ converges in
R and henceM ′ also converges in R. IfM converges to +∞, then so doesM ′ because εM ∗ is non-negative.
Hence, for allω ∈ Γ (s ),M ′ converges inR and the limit limM ′(ω) therefore exists.
Now, recall that limM ′ = liminfM ′ ≥s f and thatM ∈Mb. Hence, we have that
inf

M (s ) :M ∈Mb and limM ≥s f
	
≤M ′(s ) =M (s ) +εM ∗ ≤α+ε.
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This holds for any ε ∈R>0 and any α> EV ( f |s ), which implies that indeed
inf

M (s ) :M ∈Mb and limM ≥s f
	
≤ EV ( f |s ).
The following result shows that the condition liminfM ≥s f inDefinition3 should in factmerely hold strictly
almost surely:
Proposition 21. Consider any f ∈V and any s ∈X ∗. Then
EV ( f |s ) = inf
¦
M (s ) :M ∈Mb and liminfM ≥s f s.a.s.
©
. (6)
Proof. Since every supermartingaleM that satisfies liminfM ≥s f also satisfies liminfM ≥s f s.a.s., we clearly
have that
EV( f |s )≥ inf
¦
M (s ) :M ∈Mb and liminfM ≥s f s.a.s.
©
,
so it remains to prove the other inequality. If the right hand side of Equation (6) is equal to +∞, then this
inequality is trivially satisfied. So consider the case where it is not. Fix any α ∈ R such that α > inf

M (s ) :M ∈
Mb and liminfM ≥s f s.a.s.
	
and any ε ∈ R>0. Then there is some bounded below supermartingaleMα such
that liminfMα ≥s f s.a.s. and
Mα(s )≤α. (7)
Since liminfMα ≥s f s.a.s., there is some s -test supermartingale M ∗α that converges to +∞ on A := {ω ∈
Γ (s ) : liminfMα(ω) < f (ω)}. Consider the extended real processMα + εM
∗
α
. This process is again a bounded
below supermartingale because of Lemma 12 [which we can apply becauseMα andM
∗
α
are both bounded be-
low and hence have a common lower bound]. SinceM ∗α converges to +∞ on A and becauseMα is bounded
below, we have that liminf(Mα+εM
∗
α)(ω) = +∞≥ f (ω) for allω ∈ A. Moreover, for allω ∈ Γ (s )\A, we also have
that liminf(Mα + εM
∗
α)(ω) ≥ f (ω), because liminfMα(ω) ≥ f (ω) and because εM
∗
α is non-negative. Hence,
liminf(Mα+εM
∗
α
)≥s f and consequently EV( f |s )≤ (Mα+εM
∗
α
)(s ). It therefore follows from Equation (7) that
EV ( f |s )≤ (Mα+εM
∗
α)(s ) =Mα(s ) +ε≤ α+ε.
As this holds for any ε ∈ R>0, we have that EV ( f |s ) ≤ α, and since this is true for every α ∈ R such that α >
inf

M (s ) :M ∈Mb and liminfM ≥s f s.a.s.
	
, it follows that
EV( f |s )≤ inf
¦
M (s ) :M ∈Mb and liminfM ≥s f s.a.s.
©
.
Clearly, the infimum in (6) is taken over a larger set compared to the infimum inDefinition 3. Though the res-
ulting game-theoretic upper expectation is not impacted by this difference, it does make sure that the infimum
in (6) becomes attained:
Proposition 22. For any f ∈Vb and any s ∈X
∗, the infimum in Equation (6) is attained.
Proof. Consider any f ∈Vb and any s ∈X
∗. LetP be the extended real process defined byP (t ) := EV( f |t ) for
all t ∈X ∗. ThenP is a boundedbelow supermartingale because of Corollary 16. Moreover, because of Theorem
19, we have that liminfP ≥s f strictly almost surely. SinceP (s ) = EV( f |s ), this concludes the proof.
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6. Continuity of E V with respect tomonotone sequences
We now turn to the most important subject in this paper: continuity properties of EV . Apart from their in-
trinsic theoretical value, these properties also have great practical relevance, in the sense that they provide pos-
sible ways to calculate (upper) expectations that would otherwise be difficult or even impossible to calculate
numerically. For example, suppose that we have some variable f ∈V and some situation s ∈ X ∗ for which cal-
culating EV ( f |s ) directly is not feasible. If we can find a sequence of simpler functions fn that converges to f
in such a way that EV is continuous with respect to this convergence, then we can use EV( fn |s ) to approximate
EV( f |s ) provided that n is large enough. If the sequence of functions fn is moreover simple enough such that all
individual EV ( fn |s ) can be calculated directly, then we obtain a practical method for calculating EV( f |s ).
We start by establishing results similar to those presented in an earlier conference paper [17], where we used
a version of EV with real supermartingales instead of extended real ones. These results mainly concern continu-
ity with respect to monotone sequences that are bounded below. The first one shows that, similar to the local
models Qs , the global upper expectation EV also satisfies continuity with respect to non-decreasing sequences
that are bounded below. The idea behind this result goes back to [20, Theorem 6.6], but an updated version
can now also be found in [11, Proposition 8.3]. Once more, their setting slightly differs from ours; they do not
necessarily consider a finite state space, whereas we do not impose the additional axioms E2’–E4’ on the local
models. Moreover, their proof is only explicitly given for the case where there is a single, fixed local model Q for
all situations. For that reason, we here provide an independent proof.
Theorem 23. Consider any s ∈X ∗ and any non-decreasing sequence { fn}n∈N0 in Vb that converges pointwise to
a variable f ∈Vb . Then we have that EV( f |s ) = limn→+∞EV( fn |s ).
Proof. As f0 ∈ Vb is bounded below and the sequence { fn}n∈N0 is non-decreasing, there is anM ∈ R such that
fn ≥M for all n ∈N0 and therefore, f is also bounded below byM . Hence, since EV is constant additive [V6], we
can assume without loss of generality that f and all fn are non-negative.
That limn→+∞EV( fn |s ) exists, follows from the non-decreasing character of { fn}n∈N0 and V4. Moreover, we
have that EV( f |s ) ≥ limn→+∞EV ( fn |s ) because f ≥ fn [since { fn}n∈N0 is non-decreasing] and because EV satis-
fies V4. It remains to prove the converse inequality.
For anyn ∈N0, consider the extended real processSn , definedbySn (t ) := EV( fn |t ) for all t ∈X ∗ and the exten-
ded real process S defined by the limit S (t ) := limn→+∞Sn (t ) for all t ∈X ∗. This limit exists because {Sn (t )}n∈N0
is a non-decreasing sequence for all t ∈ X ∗, due to the monotonicity [V4] of EV . As fn is non-negative for all
n ∈N0, Sn is non-negative for all n ∈N0 because of V5 and therefore S is also non-negative. As a result, S and all
Sn are non-negative extended real processes.
It now suffices to prove that S is a bounded below supermartingale such that liminfS ≥s f s.a.s. because it
will then follow from Proposition 21 that
EV ( f |s ) = inf
¦
M (s ) :M ∈Mb and liminfM ≥s f s.a.s.
©
≤ S (s ) = lim
n→+∞
EV ( fn |s ).
This is what we now set out to do.
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We first show that S is a supermartingale; that it is bounded below follows trivially from its non-negativity.
For all situations t ∈X ∗, we already know that {Sn (t ·)}n∈N0 is a non-decreasing sequence that converges to S (t ·).
Since Sn and S are non-negative, we also have that Sn (t ·),S (t ·) ∈L b (X ). Then, due to E12, we have that
Qt (S (t ·)) = limn→+∞
Qt (Sn (t ·)) for all t ∈X
∗. (8)
Sn is a supermartingale for all n ∈ N0 because of Corollary 16, so it follows that Qt (Sn (t ·)) ≤ Sn (t ) for all n ∈ N0
and all t ∈X ∗. This implies, together with Equation (8), that
Qt (S (t ·))≤ limn→+∞
Sn (t ) = S (t ) for all t ∈X
∗.
Hence, S is a supermartingale.
To prove that liminfS ≥s f s.a.s., we will use Lévy’s zero-one law. It follows from Theorem 19 that, for all
n ∈N0, there is an s -test supermartingaleMn that converges to +∞ on the event
An :=
¦
ω ∈ Γ (s ) : liminf
m→+∞
EV( fn |ω
m )< fn (ω)
©
.
Now, consider the extended real processM , defined by
M (t ) :=
∑
n∈N0
λnMn (t ) for all t ∈X
∗,
where the coefficients λn > 0 sum to 1. Then it follows from Lemma 12 thatM is again a non-negative super-
martingale. Moreover, it is clear thatM (s ) = 1 and hence,M is an s -test supermartingale.
We show thatM converges to +∞ on all paths ω ∈ Γ (s ) such that liminfm→+∞S (ωm ) < f (ω). Clearly, M
converges to +∞ on ∪n∈N0An =: A. Consider now any path ω ∈ Γ (s ) for which liminfm→+∞S (ω
m ) < f (ω). As
explainedbefore,Sn (t ) is non-decreasing inn for all t ∈X
∗, sowehave that supn∈N0 Sn (ω
m ) = limn→+∞Sn (ω
m ) =
S (ωm ) for allm ∈N0. Since liminfm→+∞S (ω
m )< f (ω), this implies that
liminf
m→+∞
sup
n∈N0
Sn (ω
m )< lim
n→+∞
fn (ω).
Since supn∈N0 liminfm→+∞Sn (ω
m ) ≤ liminfm→+∞ supn∈N0 Sn (ω
m ) [because we obviously have that Sn (ω
m ) ≤
supn∈N0 Sn (ω
m ) for all n ,m ∈N0], this implies that
sup
n∈N0
liminf
m→+∞
EV( fn |ω
m ) = sup
n∈N0
liminf
m→+∞
Sn (ω
m )≤ liminf
m→+∞
sup
n∈N0
Sn (ω
m )< lim
n→+∞
fn (ω). (9)
Hence, there is some nω ∈N0 such that
sup
n∈N0
liminf
m→+∞
EV( fn |ω
m )< fnω (ω),
and therefore, we see that also
liminf
m→+∞
EV ( fnω |ω
m )< fnω (ω).
So ω ∈ Anω ⊆ A and, as a consequence, M converges to +∞ on ω. Hence, the s -test supermartingale M
converges to +∞ on all pathsω ∈ Γ (s ) such that liminfm→+∞S (ω
m )< f (ω), and therefore liminfS ≥s f strictly
almost surely.
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The fact that EV satisfies continuity with respect to non-decreasing sequences, together with the properties
in Proposition 13, immediately implies that EV is an upper expectation.
Corollary 24. For any s ∈X ∗, the map EV (·|s ) :V→R is an upper expectation on V.
Proof. E1 follows from V5. Properties E2, E3 and E4 respectively follow from V2, V3 and V4. Finally, E5 follows
from Theorem 23.
Another immediate consequence of Theorem 23 is that EV satisfies a version of Fatou’s lemma:
Corollary 25 (Fatou’s Lemma). For any situation s ∈ X ∗ and any sequence { fn}n∈N0 in Vb that is uniformly
bounded below, we have that EV ( f |s )≤ liminfn→+∞EV( fn |s )where f := liminfn→+∞ fn .
Proof. Consider any s ∈ X ∗ and any sequence { fn}n∈N0 in Vb that is uniformly bounded below. For all k ∈ N0,
let gk be the global variable defined by gk (ω) := infn≥k fn (ω) for allω ∈ Ω. Then limk→+∞ gk = liminfn→+∞ fn =:
f . Furthermore, {gk }k∈N0 is clearly non-decreasing and it is a sequence in Vb because { fn}n∈N0 is uniformly
bounded below. Hence, we can use Theorem 23 to find that
EV( f |s ) = lim
k→+∞
EV(gk |s ) = liminf
k→+∞
EV(gk |s )≤ liminf
k→+∞
EV( fk |s ),
where the inequality holds because, for all k ∈N0, gk ≤ fk and therefore, because of V4, also EV(gk |s ) ≤ EV( fk |s ).
The following result is entirely newand states that EV is continuouswith respect to non-increasing sequences
of lower cuts. So EV(·|s ) satisfies E6 on V for any s ∈X ∗.
Proposition 26. For any f ∈V and any s ∈X ∗, we have that limα→−∞EV ( f
∨α|s ) = EV ( f |s ).
Proof. EV( f
∨α|s ) is non-decreasing in α because f ∨α is non-decreasing in α and because EV is monotone [V4],
and therefore limα→−∞EV ( f
∨α|s ) exists. Moreover, f ∨α ≥ f for all α ∈ R, implying, by the monotonicity [V4] of
EV , that limα→−∞EV( f
∨α|s )≥ EV ( f |s ). It therefore only remains to prove the converse inequality.
If EV ( f |s ) = +∞, then limα→−∞EV( f
∨α|s ) ≤ EV ( f |s ) holds trivially. If EV ( f |s ) < +∞, fix any real c > EV( f |s ).
Then it follows from the definition of EV( f |s ) that there is some supermartingaleM ∈Mb such thatM (s ) ≤ c
and liminfM ≥s f . Since M is bounded below, it immediately follows that there is some B ∈ R such that
liminfM ≥α for all α≤ B . For such an α≤ B , we have that liminfM ≥s f
∨α, which by Definition 3 implies that
EV( f
∨α|s ) ≤M (s ) ≤ c . This holds for all α ≤ B , so we infer that limα→−∞EV ( f
∨α|s ) ≤ c , and since this holds for
any c > EV ( f |s ), we conclude that indeed limα→−∞EV ( f
∨α|s )≤ EV( f |s ).
Proposition 26 shows that EV on V ×X
∗ is uniquely determined by its values on Vb ×X
∗. Moreover, by
Theorem 23, its values onVb ×X
∗ are on their turn uniquely determined by its values onV×X ∗ (for any f ∈Vb ,
there obviously is at least one sequence inV that converges non-decreasingly to f ). Together, these observations
imply that EV is uniquely determined by its values on the gambles in V.
Proposition 26 also immediately establishes our claim fromSection 2, that the (global) game-theoretic upper
expectation is only fully compatible with the local models if the local models additionally satisfy E6:
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Corollary 27 (Compatibility with local models). For any imprecise probability tree Q, we have that EV ( f |x1:n ) =
Qx1:n ( f (x1:n ·)) for all x1:n ∈X
∗ andall (n+1)-measurable variables f ∈V, if andonly if the local upper expectations
Qs all satisfy E6 onL (X ).
Proof. Consider any x1:n ∈X ∗ and any (n+1)-measurable extended real variable f ∈V. Clearly, f ∨c is bounded
below and remains to be (n + 1)-measurable for any c ∈ R. Due to Proposition 14, we have that EV ( f
∨c |x1:n ) =
Qx1:n ( f
∨c (x1:n ·)) for any c ∈ R. Then, because EV (·|x1:n ) satisfies E6 due to Proposition 26, we clearly also have
that EV ( f |x1:n ) =Qx1:n ( f (x1:n ·)) if Qx1:n satisfies E6.
On the other hand, consider the case that there is some x1:n ∈X
∗ such that Qx1:n does not satisfy E6,meaning
that there is at least a single f ∈ L (X ) such that Qx1:n ( f ) 6= limc→−∞Qx1:n ( f
∨c ) [the limit on the right hand side
still exists because of monotonicity (E4)]. Let g ∈ V be an (n + 1)-measurable variable such that g (x1:n ·) = f .
Then, for all c ∈R, g ∨c is bounded below and (n + 1)-measurable and we clearly also have that g ∨c (x1:n ·) = f
∨c .
Hence,
Qx1:n (g (x1:n ·)) =Qx1:n ( f ) 6= limc→−∞
Qx1:n ( f
∨c ) = lim
c→−∞
Qx1:n (g
∨c (x1:n ·)) = limc→−∞
EV(g
∨c |x1:n ) = EV (g |x1:n ),
where the second to last step follows from Proposition 14 and the last step follows from Proposition 26.
Aswehave illustratedwithExample1, anupper expectation—and therefore also any local upper expectation—
does not necessarily satisfy E6. Hence, if we find compatibility (on the entire domain) between local and global
models desirable, then wewill need to impose E6 as an additional axiom on the localmodels Qs . This is also the
case even when we would adopt the stronger axioms E2’–E4’ (again, this follows from Example 1). We therefore
do not see what advantage could be gained from additionally imposing E2’–E4’ on the local models: it imposes
constraints on how the values of the localmodels can be chosen, yet does not imply any additional properties on
the global game-theoretic upper expectation (EV only depends on the values of the localmodels onL b (X ) and,
on this restricted domain, axioms E2’–E4’ are as general as E2–E4 according to Proposition 2). If one moreover
finds it desirable to have complete compatibility with the local models, then one should additionally impose E6
on the local models, irrespectively of whether he is already imposing E2’–E4’, at which point E2’–E4’ become
redundant due to Proposition 1.
7. Behaviour of E V with respect to sequences of finitary variables
Though the upper expectation EV is continuous with respect to non-decreasing sequences and with respect
to non-increasing sequences of lower cuts, it is not necessarily continuous with respect to general pointwise
convergence; see [17, Example 1] for an illustration.5 However, in many cases, the sequence of interest will be
composedoutof variables that arefinitary; the individual variables thenonlydependonafinitenumberof states.
Compared to general sequences, sequences of finitary variables tend to be more well-behaved and therefore
allow us to establish stronger continuity results. Moreover, upper expectations of finitary variables or, more
5The version of the game-theoretic upper expectation used in [17, Example 1] is with real-valued supermartingales instead of extended
real-valued ones. However, this does notmake any difference because [17, Example 1] only involves upper expectations of gambles and, on
that domain, both versions of the game-theoretic upper expectation coincide; see Proposition 36 further on.
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specifically, finitary gambles can often be computed rather efficiently; see [18]. If these computational methods
were to be combined with the appropriate continuity properties—which tend to be stronger for sequences of
finitary variables–wewould also be able to compute upper expectations of a great deal of non-finitary variables.
Because of their importance in this section, we will denote the set of all bounded below variables f ∈ Vb
such that f = limn→+∞ fn for some sequence { fn}n∈N0 of finitary variables by Vb ,lim. Our first result indicates
that the variables in Vb ,lim play a crucial role in the characterisation of game-theoretic upper expectations. It
states that the upper expectation EV ( f |s ) of any variable f ∈V, conditional on any s ∈X
∗, is the lower envelope
of the upper expectations EV (g |s ) of variables g ∈ Vb ,lim that dominate f on the domain Γ (s ). Once more, this
result allows us to conclude that EV is uniquely characterised by its values on a constrained domain; that of the
(bounded below) limits of finitary variables. We refer to [15, 16] for a more detailed discussion.
Proposition 28. Consider any f ∈V and any s ∈X ∗. Then
EV ( f |s ) = inf
¦
EV (g |s ) : g ∈Vb ,lim and g ≥s f
©
= inf
¦
EV (g |s ) : g ∈Vb ,lim and g ≥ f
©
. (10)
Proof. Because EV is monotone [V4], we have that EV( f |s ) ≤ EV(g |s ) for any g ∈ Vb ,lim such that f ≤s g . It
therefore follows immediately that
EV( f |s )≤ inf
¦
EV (g |s ) : g ∈Vb ,lim and g ≥s f
©
≤ inf
¦
EV (g |s ) : g ∈Vb ,lim and g ≥ f
©
,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that g ≥ f implies g ≥s f for any g ∈ V. It remains to prove that
inf
¦
EV (g |s ) : g ∈Vb ,lim and g ≥ f
©
≤ EV( f |s ).
Consider anyM ′ ∈Mb such that limM
′ exists within Γ (s ) and such that limM ′ ≥s f . LetM be the exten-
ded real process defined byM (t ) :=M ′(t ) for all t ⊒ s , and byM (t ) := +∞ for all t 6⊒ s . We show that M
is a bounded below supermartingale such that limM ≥ f . The processM is bounded below becauseM ′ is
bounded below. Moreover, we have, for all t ⊒ s , that Qt (M (t ·)) =Qt (M
′(t ·))≤M ′(t ) =M (t ) becauseM ′ is a
supermartingale, and, for all t 6⊒ s , we also have that Qt (M (t ·)) ≤M (t ) because thenM (t ) = +∞. Hence,M
is indeed a bounded below supermartingale. Furthermore, note that limM =s limM
′ ≥s f and, for any pathω
not going through s , that limM (ω) = +∞≥ f (ω), which all together implies that limM ≥ f .
Now, let {gn}n∈N0 be the sequence defined by gn (ω) :=M (ω
n ) for all n ∈N0 and allω ∈Ω. Then it is clear that
{gn}n∈N0 is a sequenceofn-measurable, and therefore finitary, extended real variables that is uniformlybounded
below. Moreover, since limM exists everywhere, we have that g (ω) := limn→+∞ gn (ω) = limn→+∞M (ω
n ) exists
for allω ∈Ω. Hence, g ∈Vb ,lim and because limM ≥ f also g ≥ f . It furthermore follows from Definition 3 that
EV(g |s )≤M (s ) because limM ≥s g (since, in fact, limM = g ). This implies that
inf
¦
EV(g |s ) : g ∈Vb ,lim and g ≥ f
©
≤M (s ) =M ′(s ).
Since this holds for anyM ′ ∈Mb such that limM
′ exists within Γ (s ) and limM ′ ≥s f , it follows from Proposi-
tion 20 that
inf
¦
EV (g |s ) : g ∈Vb ,lim and g ≥ f
©
≤ EV ( f |s ).
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The result above is expressed in terms of (bounded below) limits of finitary variables, but we can actually
limit ourselves to the seemingly more restricted (bounded below) limits of n-measurable gambles. This will be
established in Proposition 30 below: that each f ∈ Vb ,lim is a pointwise limit of a sequence of n-measurable
gambles. As a first step towards this result, we aim to transition from any sequence {gn}n∈N0 of finitary variables
to a sequence {g ξn }n∈N0 ofn-measurable variables,without changing theessential characteristics of the sequence.
To that end, let {g ξn }n∈N0 and ξ:N→N0 be defined by the following recursive expressions, where g
ξ
0 := c ∈R is a
freely chosen extended real number and ξ(1) := 0:
g ξn :=
¨
gξ(n ) if gξ(n ) is n-measurable;
g ξn−1 otherwise,
and ξ(n + 1) :=
¨
ξ(n ) + 1 if gξ(n ) is n-measurable;
ξ(n ) otherwise,
(11)
for all n ∈ N. Note that {gn}n∈N0 is a subsequence of {g
ξ
n }n∈N0 and that the additional terms in {g
ξ
n }n∈N0 do not
impact the limit behaviour, nor, for a suitable choice of c , the (possibly) monotone character of the original
sequence. The following lemma shows that the sequence {g ξn }n∈N0 is moreover a sequence of n-measurable
variables.
Lemma29. For any sequence {gn}n∈N0 of finitary variables, the sequence {g
ξ
n }n∈N0 is a sequence of n-measurable
variables.
Proof. We prove this by induction. g ξ0 = c is clearly 0-measurable. To prove the induction step, suppose that
g ξk−1 is (k − 1)-measurable for some k ∈ N. Then either we have that gξ(k ) is k -measurable, which directly im-
plies that g ξk = gξ(k ) is k -measurable. Otherwise, g
ξ
k is equal to g
ξ
k−1 implying that g
ξ
k is (k − 1)-measurable and
therefore automatically k -measurable. This concludes the induction step and hence, {g ξn }n∈N0 is a sequence of
n-measurable variables.
We now establish our earlier claim that the variables inVb ,lim are essentially limits of n-measurable gambles
and therefore, that Proposition 28 turns out to be stronger than it first appears.
Proposition 30. For any f ∈ Vb ,lim, f is the pointwise limit of a sequence { fn}n∈N0 of n-measurable gambles.
Furthermore, we can guarantee that B ≤ fn ≤ sup f for all n ∈N0, where B is any real if inf f =+∞ and B = inf f
otherwise.
Proof. Fix any f ∈ Vb ,lim. Then, according to the definition of Vb ,lim, f is the pointwise limit of a sequence
{gn}n∈N0 of finitary variables. Let {g
ξ
n }n∈N0 be the sequence defined by the recursive expression (11), with c = 0,
which by Lemma 29 is a sequence of n-measurable variables. As explained in the text that preceeds Lemma 29,
the sequences {gn}n∈N0 and {g
ξ
n }n∈N0 have the same limit behaviour, so {g
ξ
n }n∈N0 converges pointwise to f . Let
B be any real if inf f = +∞ and let B := inf f if inf f ∈ R [the case where inf f = −∞ is impossible because f is
bounded below]. Let { fn}n∈N0 be the sequence defined by bounding each g
ξ
n above by min{n , sup f } and below
by B ; so fn (ω) := max{min{g
ξ
n (ω),n , sup f },B} for all ω ∈ Ω and all n ∈ N0. Then it is clear that { fn}n∈N0 is a
sequence of n-measurable gambles because {g ξn }n∈N0 is a sequence of n-measurable (possibly extended real)
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variables. It also converges pointwise to f because
f (ω) =max
¦
min{ f (ω), sup f },B
©
=max
¦
min

lim
n→+∞
g ξn (ω), limn→+∞
n , sup f
	
,B
©
= lim
n→+∞
max
¦
min{g ξn (ω),n , sup f },B
©
= lim
n→+∞
fn (ω),
for allω ∈Ω, where the first equality follows from the fact that B ≤ inf f ≤ f . Moreover, for all n ∈N0, we clearly
have that B ≤ fn , and also fn ≤ sup f because min{g
ξ
n (ω),n , sup f } ≤ sup f for all ω ∈ Ω and B ≤ inf f ≤ sup f .
Hence, { fn}n∈N0 satisfies all of the conditions in the proposition.
We now present two main results. The first one states that EV is continuous with respect to non-increasing
sequences of finitary bounded above variables. The second one says that, for any f ∈Vb ,lim, there is always a se-
quence ofn-measurable gambles—and therefore also a sequence of finitary gambles—that converges pointwise
to f and for which EV is continuous.
Theorem31. For any s ∈X ∗ and any non-increasing sequence { fn}n∈N0 of finitary, bounded above variables that
converges pointwise to a variable f ∈V, we have that limn→+∞EV ( fn |s ) = EV ( f |s ).
Theorem 32. For any s ∈ X ∗ and any f ∈ Vb ,lim, there is a sequence { fn}n∈N0 of n-measurable gambles that is
uniformly bounded below and that converges pointwise to f such that limn→+∞EV ( fn |s ) = EV ( f |s ).
Both of the results above have already lead to valuable theoretical insights: Theorem 31was crucial to obtain
an equivalence result about hitting times andprobabilities in so-called impreciseMarkov chains [7]. Theorem32
on the other hand, further establishes the importance of finitary variables and their limitswhen it comes to char-
acterising EV [15, 16]. In fact, Theorem32was a key result in obtaining our alternative characterisationpresented
in [15] (or, more recently, the characterisation presented in [16]). For this reason, a version of Theorem 32 was
also already included in an online report [14] that serves as a technical reference for [15].
The remaining of this section is devoted to the proofs of Theorem 31 and 32. We start with two technical
lemmas that are key in proving them both.
Lemma 33. Consider any global variable h ∈ V taking values in N0. If h (ω) = h (ω˜) for every ω ∈ Ω and ω˜ ∈
Γ (ωh(ω)), then suph := supω∈Ωh (ω) ∈N0 and h is a (suph )-measurable gamble.
Proof. h is clearly bounded below because it takes value inN0. Moreover, it then also follows that either suph ∈
N0 or that suph =+∞. Assume ex absurdo that suph =+∞. Then we have that
sup
ω∈Ω
h (ω) = sup
x1∈X
sup
ω∈Γ (x1)
h (ω) = +∞.
SinceX is finite, there is clearly some x ∗
1
∈X for which supω∈Γ (x ∗1 )h (ω) = +∞. Similarly, we also find that
sup
ω∈Γ (x ∗1 )
h (ω) = sup
x2∈X
sup
ω∈Γ (x ∗1 x2)
h (ω) = +∞.
SinceX is finite, there is again some x ∗
2
∈X for which supω∈Γ (x ∗1 x ∗2 )h (ω) = +∞. We can continue in this way and
construct a pathω= x ∗
1
x ∗
2
...x ∗n ... for which
sup
ω′∈Γ (ωn )
h (ω′) = +∞ for all n ∈N0. (12)
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However, h takes values in N0, so h (ω) ∈ N0. This implies, together with the assumption that h (ω
′) = h (ω) for
everyω′ ∈ Γ (ωh(ω)), that
sup

h (ω′) :ω′ ∈ Γ
 
ωh(ω)
	
= sup

h (ω) :ω′ ∈ Γ
 
ωh(ω)
	
= h (ω) ∈N0.
This is in contradiction with Equation (12) [for n = h (ω)], so suph ∈ N0 which, together with the fact that h is
bounded below, implies that h is a gamble. To see that h is (suph )-measurable, consider anyω∈Ω and any ω˜ ∈
Γ (ωsuph ). Then ω˜∈ Γ (ωh(ω)) because h (ω)≤ suph and therefore, by assumption, we have that h (ω) = h (ω˜).
For the following technical lemma, we will associate with any sequence { fn}n∈N0 of n-measurable gambles
and any global variable h ∈V taking values inN0, the global variable fh ∈V defined by fh (ω) := fh(ω)(ω). We will
also need the notion of a cut U ⊂X ∗: a collection of pairwise incomparable situations. We call a cutU complete
if for allω ∈Ω there is some u ∈U such thatω∈ Γ (u ). Otherwise, we callU partial. We will also use the simpler
notation s to denote the cut {s} that consists of the single situation s ∈ X ∗. For any situation s and any cutU ,
we write s ⊏U if s ⊏ u for all u ∈U . Conversely, we writeU ⊏ s if there is a u ∈U such that u ⊏ s . In a similar
way, we extend the relations ⊑, ⊐ and ⊒. Analogously to what we did before for situations, we say that a path
ω∈Ω goes through a cutU when there is some n ∈N0 such thatω
n ∈U .
Lemma 34. Consider any s ∈X ∗ and any sequence { fn}n∈N0 of n-measurable gambles that converges pointwise
to a variable f ∈ V that is bounded above. Then, for any m ∈ N0 and any α ∈ R such that EV ( f |s ) < α, there is a
gamble h : Ω→N0 that is (suph )-measurable such that m ≤ h and EV ( fh |s )≤ α.
Proof. Fix anym ∈ N0, any α ∈ R such that EV( f |s ) < α and any ε ∈ R>0. According to the definition of EV( f |s ),
there is a supermartingaleM ∈Mb such thatM (s ) ≤ α and liminfM ≥s f . We start by showing that, for any
ω∈ Γ (s ) and any n∗ ∈N0, there is a natural number n ≥ n ∗ such thatM (ωn ) +ε≥ fn (ω).
So consider any ω ∈ Γ (s ). First note that liminfM (ω) + ε > f (ω) because liminfM ≥s f , liminfM (ω) >
−∞ [M is bounded below] and f (ω) < +∞ [ f is bounded above]. This implies that there is a real β such that
liminfM (ω) + ε > β > f (ω). Then, since { fn (ω)}n∈N0 converges to f (ω) and β is a real such that β > f (ω),
there is an index N (ω) ∈ N0 such that β > fn (ω) for all n ≥ N (ω). Furthermore, by the definition of the limit
inferior and the fact that β is a real such that liminfM (ω) +ε > β , there is a second indexM (ω) ∈N0 such that
M (ωn ) + ε > β for all n ≥ M (ω). Combined with the previous, we obtain thatM (ωn ) + ε > β > fn (ω) for all
n ≥max{N (ω),M (ω)}. Since this holds for all n ≥max{N (ω),M (ω)}, there is for any n∗ ∈N0 also an n ≥ n
∗ such
thatM (ωn ) +ε≥ fn (ω).
Let ℓ be the length of the string s and consider the variable h ∈V defined by
h (ω) :=
¨
inf

n ≥max{ℓ,m} :M (ωn ) +ε≥ fn (ω)
	
ifω ∈ Γ (s );
max{ℓ,m} otherwise,
for allω ∈Ω.
It clearly follows from the argument above thath takes values inN0. Wewill nowmoreover show thath (ω) = h (ω˜)
for anyω∈Ω and any ω˜ ∈ Γ (ωh(ω)), implying that h satisfies the conditions in Lemma 33.
Consider anyω ∈Ω and any ω˜ ∈ Γ (ωh(ω)). We distinguish two cases: ω ∈ Γ (s ) andω 6∈ Γ (s ). Ifω ∈ Γ (s ), then it
follows from the definition ofh thatM (ωh(ω))+ε≥ fh(ω)(ω). Sinceωh(ω) = ω˜h(ω) [because ω˜ ∈ Γ (ωh(ω))] and since
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fh(ω) is h (ω)-measurable, this implies thatM (ω˜
h(ω)) + ε ≥ fh(ω)(ω˜). Then, according to the definition of h and
since ω˜ ∈ Γ (s ) [because h (ω) ≥ ℓ andω ∈ Γ (s ), and therefore ω˜ ∈ Γ (ωh(ω)) ⊆ Γ (s )], we have that h (ω˜) ≤ h (ω). On
the other hand, since ω˜ ∈ Γ (s ) andω ∈ Γ (ω˜h(ω˜)) [becauseωh(ω) = ω˜h(ω) and h (ω˜)≤ h (ω)], we can infer, in exactly
the same way as before, that h (ω) ≤ h (ω˜). So we conclude that h (ω) = h (ω˜) in case that ω ∈ Γ (s ). If ω 6∈ Γ (s ),
then ω˜ 6∈ Γ (s ) because h (ω)≥ ℓ and therefore Γ (ωh(ω))∩ Γ (s ) = ;. Then it follows immediately from the definition
of h that h (ω) = h (ω˜). Hence, h satisfies the conditions in Lemma 33, so we have that h is a (suph )-measurable
gamble, with suph ∈N0. Furthermore, we trivially have that h ≥ ℓ and h ≥m .
LetU := {t ∈X ∗ : (∃ω∈Ω)t =ωh(ω)}. Note that any two (different) situations t and u inU are incomparable.
Indeed, assume ex absurdo that this is not the case. Then there are at least two different situations t ,u ∈ U
such that t ⊑ u . Let ω and ω˜ be two paths such that t = ωh(ω) and u = ω˜h(ω˜). Since t ⊑ u , we have that
ω˜ ∈ Γ (t ) = Γ (ωh(ω)), which due to our previous considerations implies that h (ω˜) = h (ω). Hence, taking into
account that ω˜ ∈ Γ (ωh(ω)), we infer thatωh(ω) = ω˜h(ω˜) and therefore that t = u . This is in contradiction with our
assumption that t and u are different, so we conclude that all situations inU are pairwise incomparable and
therefore, thatU is a cut. U is also a complete cut because h takes values inN0.
For any situation t ⊒U , let us write u (t ) to denote the unique situation inU such that u (t ) ⊑ t . That u (t )
is unique follows from the fact that the situations inU are incomparable. Indeed, if there would be a second
u ′(t ) ∈U such that u ′(t )⊑ t , this would imply that either u (t )⊑ u ′(t ) or u ′(t )⊑ u (t ), which is impossible since
u (t ) and u ′(t ) are incomparable. Now letMU be the extended real process defined by
MU (t ) :=
¨
M (u (t )) ifU ⊏ t ;
M (t ) ifU 6⊏ t ,
for all t ∈X ∗.
The processMU is bounded below becauseM is bounded below. To see thatMU is a supermartingale, note
that
MU (t ·) :=
¨
M (u (t )) ifU ⊑ t ;
M (t ·) ifU 6⊑ t ,
for all t ∈X ∗.
So for any situation t ⊒ U , we have that MU (t ) = M (u (t )) and that MU (t ·) = M (u (t )), which implies that
Qt (MU (t ·)) =MU (t ) because of E7. On the other hand, for any situation t 6⊒U , we also have that Qt (MU (t ·))≤
MU (t ) because Qt (M (t ·))≤M (t ) [M is a supermartingale]. As a consequence,MU is a bounded below super-
martingale.
For anyω ∈Ω, we now let u (ω) be the unique situation inU such thatω ∈ Γ (u (ω)). Then clearly u (ω) =ωh(ω).
Moreover, for anm ∈ N0 large enough such thatU ⊏ω
m , we also have thatMU (ω
m ) =M (u (ωm )) =M (u (ω)).
Hence,
lim
m→+∞
MU (ω
m ) = lim
m→+∞
M (u (ω)) =M (u (ω)) =M (ωh(ω)) for allω ∈Ω.
Therefore, by definition of h , we have that
lim
m→+∞
MU (ω
m ) +ε=M (ωh(ω)) +ε≥ fh(ω)(ω) =: fh (ω) for allω ∈ Γ (s ).
Then by Definition 3 and taking into account thatMU ∈ Mb and therefore [MU + ε] ∈ Mb [because the local
models Qs satisfy E8], it follows that EV ( fh |s )≤MU (s )+ε. Moreover,MU (s ) =M (s ) because h ≥ ℓ and therefore
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U 6⊏ s , so we also have that EV ( fh |s )≤M (s ) +ε≤ α+ε. Since this inequality holds for any ε ∈R>0, we infer that
EV( fh |s )≤α, which together with the fact that h is a (suph )-measurable gamble such thatm ≤ h , establishes the
lemma.
The idea underlying the proof of Theorem 31 originates from a result by some of us [3, Theorem 3] that was
never published. However, once more, real supermartingales were adopted there. Moreover, our result here
considers sequences of (extended real) finitary variables that are bounded above, instead of sequences of n-
measurable gambles.
Proof of Theorem31. Fix any s ∈X ∗ and any non-increasing sequence { fn}n∈N0 of finitary, bounded above vari-
ables that converges pointwise to a variable f ∈V. Note that f is then also bounded above. Because fn ≥ fn+1 ≥ f
for all n ∈ N0 and EV is monotone [V4], the limit limn→+∞EV ( fn |s ) exists and we have that limn→+∞EV ( fn |s ) ≥
EV( f |s ). So we are left to show that limn→+∞EV ( fn |s )≤ EV ( f |s ).
Consider the sequence { f ∨−nn }n∈N0 and note that it suffices to show that limn→+∞EV ( f
∨−n
n |s )≤ EV ( f |s ), where
the limit limn→+∞EV ( f ∨−nn |s ) exists because { f
∨−n
n }n∈N0 is clearlynon-increasing [since { fn}n∈N0 is non-increasing]
and EV is monotone [V4]. Indeed, it will then follow that limn→+∞EV( fn |s ) ≤ EV ( f |s ) because fn ≤ f
∨−n
n for all
n ∈N0 and therefore, by V4, that limn→+∞EV( fn |s )≤ limn→+∞EV ( f
∨−n
n |s )≤ EV( f |s ).
Since { fn}n∈N0 is a sequence of finitary variables that converges non-increasingly to f , the same holds for
the sequence { f ∨−nn }n∈N0 . In fact, { f
∨−n
n }n∈N0 is even a sequence of finitary gambles because each fn is bounded
above. Now let gn := f
∨−n
n for all n ∈ N0 and consider the sequence {g
ξ
n }n∈N0 defined by the recursive expres-
sion (11), with c ∈ R such that c ≥ g0. Due to Lemma 29, {g
ξ
n }n∈N0 is a sequence of n-measurable variables.
Since {gn}n∈N0 = { f
∨−n
n }n∈N0 is a sequence of finitary gambles that converges non-increasingly to f , it follows
fromEquation (11) and our choice of c that {g ξn }n∈N0 is a sequence ofn-measurable gambles that converges non-
increasingly to f . Indeed, it can easily be checked that the transition from {gn}n∈N0 to {g
ξ
n }n∈N0 preserves limit
behaviour, the non-increasing character and the fact that the individual elements of the sequence are gambles.
In the same way, we can also see that
lim
n→+∞
EV( f
∨−n
n |s ) = limn→+∞
EV (gn |s ) = limn→+∞
EV(g
ξ
n |s ). (13)
Consider any real α > EV( f |s ), which is guaranteed to exist because f is bounded above and therefore, by V1,
EV( f |s ) < +∞. Then since {g
ξ
n }n∈N0 is a sequence of n-measurable gambles that converges non-increasingly
to f , Lemma 34 implies that there is a gambleh : Ω→N0 that is (suph )-measurable and is such that EV(g
ξ
h |s )≤ α
[we simply let m = 0 in the lemma]. Since {g ξn }n∈N0 is non-increasing and EV is monotone [V4], we have that
EV(g
ξ
h |s )≥ EV(g
ξ
suph |s )≥ limn→+∞EV (g
ξ
n |s ), so we infer that limn→+∞EV(g
ξ
n |s )≤α. Recalling Equation (13), it fol-
lows that limn→+∞EV ( f
∨−n
n |s )≤α. Since thisholds for any realα> EV( f |s ), we conclude that limn→+∞EV ( f
∨−n
n |s )≤
EV( f |s ) as desired.
For any countable net {c (m ,n )}m ,n∈N0 in R, we say that c := lim(m ,n )→+∞ c (m ,n ) is the Moore-Smith limit of
{c (m ,n )}m ,n∈N0 if, for each neighbourhood A of c , there is a couple (m
∗,n ∗) ∈N2
0
such that c (m ,n ) ∈ A for allm ≥m
∗
and all n ≥ n ∗. Then, for any countable net { f (m ,n )}m ,n∈N0 inV such that lim(m ,n )→+∞ f (m ,n )(ω) exists for allω∈Ω,
we write lim(m ,n )→+∞ f (m ,n ) to denote the variable in V defined by lim(m ,n )→+∞ f (m ,n )(ω) for allω∈Ω.
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Lemma35. Considerany sequence { fn}n∈N0 inV that convergespointwise to somevariable f ∈Vb . Then lim(m ,n )→+∞ f
∧m
n =
f .
Proof. Consider any ω ∈ Ω. First consider the case that f (ω) ∈ R and fix any ε ∈ R>0. Then there is an n
∗ ∈ N0
such that | fn (ω)− f (ω)| ≤ ε for all n ≥ n
∗. Consider anym ∗ ≥ f (ω) + ε. Then for all n ≥ n ∗ and allm ≥m ∗, we
have that fn (ω) ≤ f (ω) + ε ≤ m , so f ∧mn (ω) = fn (ω) and therefore | f
∧m
n (ω)− f (ω)| = | fn (ω)− f (ω)| ≤ ε. So we
have that lim(m ,n )→+∞ f
∧m
n (ω) = f (ω). If f (ω) = +∞, fix any α> 0. Then there is an n
∗ ∈N0 such that fn (ω) ≥ α
for all n ≥ n ∗. If we now take m ∗ ≥ α, then clearly also f ∧mn (ω) ≥ α for all n ≥ n
∗ and allm ≥ m ∗. Hence, we
have that lim(m ,n )→+∞ f
∧m
n (ω) = f (ω)which, together with our earlier considerations, allows us to conclude that
lim(m ,n )→+∞ f
∧m
n = f .
Proof of Theorem 32. Fix any s ∈ X ∗ and any f ∈ Vb ,lim. According to Proposition 30, there is a sequence
{ fn}n∈N0 of n-measurable gambles that converges pointwise to f and such that B ≤ fn ≤ sup f for all n ∈ N0,
where B is any real if inf f = +∞ and B := inf f if inf f ∈ R [inf f = −∞ is impossible because f is bounded
below]. Fix any ℓ ∈ N and note that the sequence { f ∧ℓn }n∈N0 is a sequence of n-measurable gambles that con-
verges pointwise to f ∧ℓ because { fn}n∈N0 is a sequence of n-measurable gambles that converges pointwise to
f . Moreover, f ∧ℓ is bounded above by ℓ, so Lemma 34 guarantees that, for any m ∈ N0 and any α ∈ R such
that EV( f
∧ℓ|s ) < α, there is a gamble h : Ω→ N0 that is (suph )-measurable such that m ≤ h and EV ( f
∧ℓ
h |s ) ≤ α.
Since f ∧ℓ is both bounded below and above and EV satisfies V5, we have that EV ( f ∧ℓ|s ) ∈ R and therefore, that
EV( f
∧ℓ|s ) < EV ( f
∧ℓ|s ) + 1/ℓ. So in particular, Lemma 34 guarantees that, for any m ∈ N0, there is a gamble
h : Ω→N0 that is (suph )-measurable such thatm ≤ h and EV( f
∧ℓ
h |s )≤ EV ( f
∧ℓ|s )+1/ℓ. This holds for any ℓ ∈N, so
there is a sequence {hℓ}ℓ∈N0 of (suphℓ)-measurable gambleshℓ : Ω→N0 such thath0 = 0 and, for all ℓ∈N, satisfies
hℓ ≥ suphℓ−1 + 1 and EV ( f
∧ℓ
hℓ
|s ) ≤ EV( f
∧ℓ|s ) + 1/ℓ. We now show that { f ∧ℓhℓ }ℓ∈N0 is a sequence of finitary gambles
that is uniformly bounded below and that converges pointwise to f such that limℓ→+∞EV( f
∧ℓ
hℓ
|s ) = EV ( f |s ).
Each f ∧ℓhℓ is a gamble because it is bounded above by ℓ and because, since each fn is bounded below by B ,
f ∧ℓhℓ is bounded below by min{B ,ℓ}. It then also immediately follows that { f
∧ℓ
hℓ
}ℓ∈N0 is uniformly bounded below
by min{B , 0}. Moreover, each f ∧ℓhℓ is finitary because hℓ is (suphℓ)-measurable. Indeed, the latter implies that
hℓ(ω) = hℓ(ω˜) for anyω∈Ω and any ω˜ ∈ Γ (ω
(suphℓ)). Then we also have that
f ∧ℓhℓ (ω) := f
∧ℓ
hℓ(ω)
(ω) = f ∧ℓhℓ(ω˜)(ω) = f
∧ℓ
hℓ(ω˜)
(ω˜) =: f ∧ℓhℓ (ω˜),
where the third step follows from the fact that f ∧ℓhℓ(ω˜) is hℓ(ω˜)-measurable and that ω˜ ∈ Γ (ω
(suphℓ)) ⊆ Γ (ωhℓ(ω˜))
because hℓ(ω˜)≤ suphℓ. As a consequence, f
∧ℓ
hℓ
is (suphℓ)-measurable too and therefore, finitary.
To see that { f ∧ℓhℓ }ℓ∈N0 converges pointwise to f , recall that { fn}n∈N0 is a sequence of gambles that converges
pointwise to f ∈ Vb ,lim. So Lemma 35 implies that lim(ℓ,n )→+∞ f
∧ℓ
n = f , meaning that, for any ω ∈ Ω and any
neighbourhood A of f (ω), there is a couple (ℓ∗,n ∗) ∈ N2
0
such that f ∧ℓn (ω) ∈ A for all ℓ ≥ ℓ
∗ and all n ≥ n ∗. Then,
since {hℓ}ℓ∈N0 is increasing in ℓ [because hℓ ≥ suphℓ−1 + 1 for all ℓ ∈ N], there is an ℓ
′ ∈ N0 such that ℓ ≥ ℓ
∗ and
hℓ(ω) ≥ n ∗ for all ℓ ≥ ℓ′. Together with the previous, this implies that f
∧ℓ
hℓ
(ω) := f ∧ℓhℓ(ω)(ω) ∈ A for all ℓ ≥ ℓ
′. Since
there is such an ℓ′ ∈N0 for anyω ∈Ω and any neighbourhood A of f (ω), we have that limℓ→+∞ f
∧ℓ
hℓ
= f .
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Finally, to see that limℓ→+∞EV ( f
∧ℓ
hℓ
|s ) = EV( f |s ), recall that {hℓ}ℓ∈N0 is such that EV ( f
∧ℓ
hℓ
|s )≤ EV( f
∧ℓ|s )+1/ℓ for
all ℓ∈N. So we have that
limsup
ℓ→+∞
EV ( f
∧ℓ
hℓ
|s )≤ limsup
ℓ→+∞

EV( f
∧ℓ|s ) + 1/ℓ

= limsup
ℓ→+∞
EV ( f
∧ℓ|s ) = EV( f |s ),
where the last equality follows from Theorem 23 which we can apply because { f ∧ℓ}ℓ∈N0 is a non-decreasing se-
quence inVb [because f is bounded below] that converges pointwise to f ∈Vb . On the other hand, we have that
liminfℓ→+∞EV( f
∧ℓ
hℓ
|s ) ≥ EV( f |s ) because of Corollary 25 and the fact that { f
∧ℓ
hℓ
}ℓ∈N0 is uniformly bounded below
bymin{B , 0} and converges pointwise to f . Hence, we conclude that limℓ→+∞EV( f
∧ℓ
hℓ
|s ) = EV ( f |s ).
Our last step of the proof consists in modifying { f ∧ℓhℓ }ℓ∈N0 such that it becomes a sequence of n-measurable
gambles that still is uniformly bounded below and converges pointwise to f in such a way that it is continu-
ous with respect to EV . We consider the sequence { f
′
ℓ }ℓ∈N0 :=

( f ∧ℓhℓ )
ξ
	
ℓ∈N0
defined through the recursive ex-
pression (11), with c = 0. Then Lemma 29 guarantees that { f ′ℓ }ℓ∈N0 is a sequence of n-measurable variables.
Moreover, from (11), it should be clear that { f ′ℓ }ℓ∈N0 is also a sequence of gambles that is uniformly bounded
below and that converges pointwise to f such that limℓ→+∞EV( f
′
ℓ |s ) = EV( f |s ). Indeed, in the same way as we
have argued in the proof of Theorem 31, this follows from the fact that { f ∧ℓhℓ }ℓ∈N0 is a sequence of gambles that is
uniformly bounded below and that converges pointwise to f such that limℓ→+∞EV( f
∧ℓ
hℓ
|s ) = EV( f |s ). So we con-
clude that { f ′ℓ }ℓ∈N0 is a sequence of n-measurable gambles that is uniformly bounded below and that converges
pointwise to f such that limℓ→+∞EV ( f
′
ℓ |s ) = EV ( f |s ).
8. Discussion and alternative versions of game-theoretic upper expectations
An important contribution of this article consisted in providing an overview of the main properties that are
satisfiedby a particular game-theoretic upper expectation operator, for the casewhere state spaces are assumed
finite. Some of these properties were already shown to hold in a slightly different setting, and our contribution
then consisted in adapting them to our setting. Other properties, mainly situated in Section 6 and 7, are entirely
new and bring about novel insights. Section 7 for example, shows that the game-theoretic upper expectation EV
behaves in a particularly interesting waywith respect to (limits of) finitary variables: Proposition 28 implies that
EV is uniquely characterised by its values on the domain Vb ,lim, whereas Theorems 31 and 32 show that EV has
rather strong continuity properties when it comes to sequences of finitary variables. These results have already
proven useful elsewhere, to show how game-theoretic upper expectations can be alternatively characterised
without the use of supermartingales [15, 16].
It also became apparent, as a consequence of Proposition 2, that Shafer and Vovk’s axiomatisation for a
local upper expectation can be weakened—and therefore generalised—while leaving the resulting global game-
theoretic upper expectation unaffected. This weaker axiomatisationwasmoreover shown to be equivalent with
a particular extension of coherence to extended real-valued variables; see Proposition 7. Finally, we also proved
that our axiomatisation, and even Shafer and Vovk’s stronger axiomatisation, do not suffice in order to guar-
antee compatibility of the local models with the global game-theoretic upper expectation. Indeed, it followed
from Example 1 and Corollary 27 that compatibility is only guaranteed if we additionally impose E6 on the local
models.
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Now, before we conclude the article, we want to clarify why we have chosen to work with the specific game-
theoretic upper expectation in Definition 3. As already mentioned in the introduction, it seems appropriate to
motivate this, becausemany slightly different versions of this definitionhave appeared throughout the literature
[4, 10, 12, 20], and it may perhaps not be entirely clear what these differences entail.
Most of the versions that appear in the literature only differ in how the supermartingales are allowed to be-
have. In Section 5, it was shown that the definition of EV is fairly robust with respect to changes that concern
the limit behaviour of supermartingales and, more specifically, how this limit behaviour relates to the variable f
in consideration: see also [11, Sections 7–8]. However, an aspect that does impact the resulting game-theoretic
upper expectation, and which was often reconsidered as well, is whether to define supermartingales as real pro-
cesses or as extended real processes, and whether they should be bounded below or not. Let us first focus on
the latter.
Intuitively, we think it is more natural to assume that supermartingales should be bounded below, because
we interpret supermartingales as capital processes and one cannot borrow an infinite or unbounded amount of
money. There is more to this than mere intuition though, because this assumption also avoids the undesirable
situation where the upper expectation would be lower than the lower expectation [4, Example 1]. This would
occur irrespectively ofwhether supermartingales are assumed tobe real-valued or extended real-valued. Indeed,
letM be the set of all (not necessarily bounded below) extended real-valued supermartingales, letM′ ⊆M be the
subset of all real-valued supermartingales, and let Eub andE
′
ub be the game-theoretic upper expectations that are
obtainedby replacing the setMb inDefinition 3with the respective setsM andM
′. SinceM′ ⊆M, we clearly have
that Eub( f |s )≤ E
′
ub( f |s ) and E
′
ub
( f |s )≤ Eub( f |s ) for all f ∈V and all s ∈X
∗. Now, as was shown in [4, Example 1],
there is some f ∈V and some s ∈X ∗ (and some imprecise probability tree) such that E′
ub
( f |s )> E′ub( f |s ), which
thenalso implies that Eub( f |s )> Eub( f |s ). Inorder toprevent this fromhappening, we limit ourselves tobounded
below (extended real-valued or real-valued) supermartingales.
Then we are left with the question of whether to allow supermartingales to become extended real-valued
or not. Let us writeM′b to denote the set of all real-valued bounded below supermartingales and let E
′
V be the
corresponding game-theoretic upper expectation:
E′V ( f |s ) := inf

M (s ) :M ∈M′b and liminfM ≥s f
	
for all f ∈V and all s ∈X ∗.
At first sight, one would be inclined to use the game-theoretic upper expectation E′V with real-valued super-
martingales, because it allows for a more direct interpretation. Indeed, if we interpret a supermartingale as the
possible evolution of a person’s capital, it is not clear to us what it means if this person’s capital would become
infinite in value. Such a version E′V with real supermartingales seemed to work fine and it was adopted in earlier
work by both ourselves [4, 17] and by Shafer and Vovk [10, 20], where mainly real-valued or bounded variables
were considered. In fact, on the domain V×X ∗ of all gambles (and all situations), it is not difficult to see that
this version E′V is equivalent to our version EV with extended real-valued supermartingales; see Proposition 36
below.
Beforeweestablish this though,wewant todraw theattention to the fact that there is yet another,maybeeven
more intuitive, possible way of defining game-theoretic upper expectations: using bounded (above and below)
real-valued supermartingales. On the one hand, as we already explained, we consider it sensible to assume that
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supermartingales should be bounded below because one cannot borrow an infinite or unbounded amount of
money. On the other hand, for similar reasons, we could also impose that supermartingales should be bounded
above; receiving an infinite or unbounded amount of money seems impossible in practice too. We therefore
think it is appropriate to also consider a definition of the game-theoretic upper expectation with bounded (and
hence real-valued) supermartingales. LetM′′b be the set of all such bounded (real-valued) supermartingales and
let E′′V be the corresponding game-theoretic upper expectation:
E′′V ( f |s ) := inf

M (s ) :M ∈M′′b and liminfM ≥s f
	
for all f ∈V and all s ∈X ∗.
Despite that it allows for a rather direct interpretation, such a versionE′′V of the game-theoretic upper expectation
has, to the best of our knowledge, never beenused in the literature. The reason, presumable, is that for extended
real variables f that are not bounded above, the value of E′′V( f ) does not provide any information because it will
simply be equal to +∞; that is, the infimum over the empty set. However, as our next result shows, this version
E′′V coincides with our version EV—and therefore also with the version E
′
V that uses real-valued bounded below
supermartingales—on the domain V×X ∗ of all gambles (and all situations).
Proposition 36. For any gamble f ∈V and any situation s ∈X ∗, we have that EV( f |s ) = E
′
V ( f |s ) = E
′′
V( f |s ).
This result relies on the following two lemmas.
Lemma 37. For anyM ∈Mb and any B ∈ R, the processMB , defined byMB (s ) :=min{M (s ),B} for all s ∈ X
∗,
is a bounded real-valued supermartingale.
Proof. It is clear that, sinceM is a bounded below extended real process,MB is a bounded (above and below)
real process. Moreover,MB (s ) ≤M (s ) for all s ∈ X ∗, so it follows thatMB (s ·) ≤M (s ·) for all s ∈ X ∗. Fix any
s ∈X ∗. IfM (s ) ≤ B , then
Qs (MB (s ·))≤Qs (M (s ·))≤M (s ) =MB (s ),
where thefirst equality follows fromthemonotonicity [E4]ofQs (and the fact thatM (s ·) andMB (s ·) arebounded
below). IfM (s )> B , it follows fromMB (s ·)≤ B and the monotonicity [E4] of Qs that
Qs (MB (s ·))≤Qs (B )
E1
= B =MB (s ).
So, we conclude that Qs (MB (s ·)) ≤MB (s ) for all situations s ∈X
∗. Hence,MB is a bounded real-valued super-
martingale.
Lemma 38. For any extended real processP and any pathω ∈Ω, we have that
min
n
B , liminf
n→+∞
P (ωn )
o
= liminf
n→+∞
min{B ,P (ωn )} for all B ∈R.
Proof. Fix any B ∈ R. It is easy to check that min{B , liminfn→+∞P (ωn )} ≥ liminfn→+∞min{B ,P (ωn )}. We
prove the converse inequality by contradiction. Suppose that
min
n
B , liminf
n→+∞
P (ωn )
o
> liminf
n→+∞
min{B ,P (ωn )},
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or, equivalently, that
min
n
B , liminf
n→+∞
P (ωn )
o
> sup
m
inf
n≥m
min{B ,P (ωn )}.
Then there is some ε ∈R>0 such that
min
n
B , liminf
n→+∞
P (ωn )
o
−ε> inf
n≥m
min{B ,P (ωn )}=min
n
B , inf
n≥m
P (ωn )
o
for allm ∈N0. Since min{B , liminfn→+∞P (ω
n )}−ε< B , it can only be that
inf
n≥m
P (ωn )<min
n
B , liminf
n→+∞
P (ωn )
o
−ε≤ liminf
n→+∞
P (ωn )−ε for allm ∈N0,
fromwhich we infer that infn≥mP (ω
n )< supk infn≥k P (ω
n )−ε for allm ∈N0. This contradicts the definition of
the supremum operator.
Proof of Proposition 36. SinceM′′b ⊆M
′
b ⊆Mb, it is clear that EV( f |s )≤ E
′
V ( f |s )≤ E
′′
V ( f |s ). So it suffices to prove
that E′′V( f |s ) ≤ EV ( f |s ). Consider anyM ∈Mb such that liminfM ≥s f . Let B := sup f and letMB be defined
byMB (t ) :=min{M (t ),B} for all t ∈X ∗. Since f is a gamble, sup f is real and hence, due to Lemma 37,MB is
a bounded real-valued supermartingale. Moreover, we have that B ≥ f and liminfM ≥s f , and therefore that
min{B , liminfM}≥s f , which by Lemma 38 implies that liminfMB ≥s f . Together with the fact thatM B ∈M
′′
b ,
this implies by the definition of E′′V that E
′′
V ( f |s ) ≤ M B (s ) ≤ M (s ). Since this holds for anyM ∈ Mb such that
liminfM ≥s f , we infer from the definition of EV that E
′′
V( f |s )≤ EV ( f |s ).
So the versions EV , E
′
V and E
′′
V are all mathematically equivalent onV×X
∗. We therefore E′′V over both EV and
E′V on V×X
∗ because it can be given a (more) direct interpretation. However, if we consider the entire domain
V×X ∗, then the version E′′V is unsuitable because, as explained above, it assigns+∞ to every variable that is not
bounded above. Our remaining two options are then to use either EV or E
′
V . From a purely interpretational point
of view,wepreferE′V . Unfortunately though, the versionE
′
V—andalso theversionE
′′
V—doesnot satisfy continuity
with respect to non-decreasing sequences, which we consider to be an important mathematical drawback.
Example 2. Consider an uncertain process with state space X := {0,1} and let Q( f ) := f (0) for all f ∈ L (X ).
It can easily be checked that Q satisfies properties E1–E5. For any n ∈ N, the variable nI1(X1) is a gamble, so
Proposition36 implies thatEV(nI1(X1)) = E
′
V (nI1(X1)) = E
′′
V(nI1(X1)). Then, taking intoaccount theboundedness of
nI1(X1), it follows fromProposition14 thatE
′′
V (nI1(X1)) = E
′
V (nI1(X1)) = EV(nI1(X1)) =Q(nI1), which bydefinition
of Q leads us to conclude that E
′′
V (nI1(X1)) = E
′
V(nI1(X1)) = nI1(0) = 0 for all n ∈N.
On the other hand, consider the upper expectation E′V
 
+∞I1(X1)

. It is defined as the infimum ofM () over
real-valued supermartingalesM ∈M′b such that liminfM ≥ +∞I1(X1). Any such supermartingaleM should
converge to +∞ on all paths ω ∈ Γ (1) such that ω1 = 1. SinceM ∈M′b ⊆Mb, we can then apply Lemma 11 to
infer thatM (1) = +∞. This contradicts the real-valuedness ofM , which allows us to conclude that there is no
M ∈M′b such that liminfM ≥+∞I1(X1). Hence, E
′
V
 
+∞I1(X1)

=+∞ and therefore, because E′V
 
+∞I1(X1)

≤
E′′V
 
+∞I1(X1)

(recall thatM′′b ⊆M
′
b), also E
′′
V
 
+∞I1(X1)

=+∞.
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All together, wehave that limn→+∞nI1(X1) = +∞I1(X1)but limn→+∞E
′
V
 
nI1(X1)

6= E′V
 
+∞I1(X1)

and limn→+∞E
′′
V
 
nI1(X1)

6=
E′′V
 
+∞I1(X1)

, which implies that both E′V and E
′′
V fail to satisfy continuity with respect to non-decreasing se-
quences. ◊
We chose to work with the version EV throughout the whole paper and therefore implicitly adopted the as-
sumption that global (game-theoretic) upper expectations satisfy continuity with respect to non-decreasing se-
quences. Note that this is in line with how we introduced our local uncertainty models Qs : the continuity prop-
erty E5 was directly adopted as part of their definition. The fact that our global upper expectation EV (and each
local upper expectation) satisfies this non-decreasing continuity ismathematically convenient, however, it does
necessitate a more abstract definition compared to E′V or E
′′
V . Nonetheless, we do not regard this as an issue be-
cause, on the domain V×X ∗, our version EV is equivalent to the version E
′′
V (or E
′
V). So one could just as well
consider it to be defined as E′′V (or E
′
V) on this restricted domain. Then, as far as the values of EV on (V \V)×X
∗
are concerned, recall that these are uniquely determined by the values on V×X ∗ through the continuity of EV ;
see the discussion belowProposition 26. Hence, we can regard EV on (V\V)×X
∗ as an extension of EV onV×X
∗,
where the latter is justified by its equivalence with E′′V , and where the extension is motivated by assumptions of
continuity.
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Appendix A. Proofs of the results in Section 5
In the following proofs, wewill frequently use the terminology and notations concerning cuts, as introduced
in the paragraph above Lemma 34. Moreover, for any two cutsU and V , we will writeU ⊏ V if (∀v ∈ V )(∃u ∈
U )u ⊏ v , and similarly for the relations ⊑, ⊐ and ⊒. We will also consider the following sets:
[U ,V ] := {s ∈X ∗ : (∃u ∈U )(∃v ∈ V )u ⊑ s ⊑ v },
[U ,V ) := {s ∈X ∗ : (∃u ∈U )(∃v ∈ V )u ⊑ s ⊏ v },
(U ,V ] := {s ∈X ∗ : (∃u ∈U )(∃v ∈ V )u ⊏ s ⊑ v },
(U ,V ) := {s ∈X ∗ : (∃u ∈U )(∃v ∈ V )u ⊏ s ⊏ v }.
Proof of Proposition 17. Let t ∈ X ∗ be any fixed situation whereM (t ) is real. We can assume thatM is non-
negative and thatM (t ) = 1 without loss of generality. Indeed, because the original supermartingale is bounded
below and real in t , we can obtain such a process by translating and scaling—by adding a positive constant and
then multiplying the supermartingale by a positive real—the originally considered supermartingale in an ap-
propriate way. This process will then again be a (bounded below) supermartingale because the localmodels Qs
satisfy E8 and E9. Moreover, the new supermartingale will have the same convergence character as the original
one.
To start, fix any couple of rational numbers 0 < a < b and consider the following recursively constructed
sequences of cuts {U a ,bk }k∈N and {V
a ,b
k }k∈N. Let V
a ,b
1
:= {s ⊒ t : M (s ) < a and (∀s ′ ∈ [t , s ))M (s ′) ≥ a } and, for
k ∈N,
1. let
U a ,bk := {s ∈X
∗ : V a ,bk ⊏ s :M (s )> b and (∀s
′ ∈ (V a ,bk , s ))M (s
′)≤ b };
2. let
V a ,bk+1 := {s ∈X
∗ :U a ,bk ⊏ s , M (s )< a and (∀s
′ ∈ (U a ,bk , s ))M (s
′)≥ a };
Note that allU a ,bk and all V
a ,b
k are indeed (partial or complete) cuts.
Next, consider the extended real processM a ,b defined byM a ,b (s ) :=M (t ) for all s 6⊐ t and by
M a ,b (s x ) :=
¨
M a ,b (s ) + [M (s x )−M (s )] if s ∈ [V a ,bk ,U
a ,b
k ) for some k ∈N;
M a ,b (s ) otherwise,
(A.1)
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for all s x ⊐ t with x ∈ X . We prove thatM a ,b is a non-negative supermartingale that converges to +∞ on all
pathsω∈ Γ (t ) such that
liminfM (ω)< a < b < limsupM (ω). (A.2)
For any situation s and for any k ∈N, whenU a ,bk ⊏ s , we denote by u
s
k the (necessarily unique) situation inU
a ,b
k
such that u sk ⊏ s . Similarly, for any k ∈N, when V
a ,b
k ⊏ s , we denote by v
s
k the (necessarily unique) situation in
V a ,bk such that v
s
k ⊏ s . Note that V
a ,b
1 ⊏U
a ,b
1 ⊏ V
a ,b
2 ⊏ · · · ⊏ V
a ,b
n ⊏U
a ,b
n ⊏ · · · . Hence, for any situation s we can
distinguish the following three cases:
• The first case is that V a ,b1 6⊏ s . Then we have that
M a ,b (s ) =M a ,b (t ) =M (t ) = 1. (A.3)
• The second case is that V a ,bk ⊏ s andU
a ,b
k 6⊏ s for some k ∈ N. Then by applying Equation (A.1) for each sub-
sequent step and cancelling out the intermediate terms, which is possible becauseM is real for any situation
s ′ ∈ X ∗ such that V a ,bk ′ ⊑ s
′ andU a ,bk ′ 6⊑ s
′ for some k ′ ∈ N [this follows readily from the definition of the cuts
V a ,bk ′ andU
a ,b
k ′ ], we have that
M a ,b (s )−M a ,b (t ) =
k−1∑
ℓ=1

M (u s
ℓ
)−M (v s
ℓ
)

+M (s )−M (v sk ). (A.4)
• The third case is thatU a ,bk ⊏ s and V
a ,b
k+1 6⊏ s for some k ∈N. Then we have that
M a ,b (s )−M a ,b (t ) =
k∑
ℓ=1
[M (u s
ℓ
)−M (v s
ℓ
)], (A.5)
where, again, we used the fact thatM is real for any situation s ′ ∈ X ∗ such that V a ,bk ′ ⊑ s
′ andU a ,bk ′ 6⊑ s
′ for
some k ′ ∈N.
ThatM a ,b (s ) is non-negative, is trivially satisfied in the first case becauseM is non-negative. To see that
this is also true for the third case, observe that 0< b <M (u sℓ ) and 0≤M (v
s
ℓ )< a for all ℓ ∈ {1, ...,k }. This implies
thatM (u sℓ )−M (v
s
ℓ )> b −a > 0 for all ℓ∈ {1, ...,k } and therefore directly thatM
a ,b (s ) is non-negative because of
Equation (A.5) and the fact thatM a ,b (t ) =M (t ) is non-negative. In the second case, it follows from Equations
(A.3), (A.4) and (A.5) that
M a ,b (s ) =M a ,b (v sk ) +M (s )−M (v
s
k ). (A.6)
We prove by induction thatM a ,b (v sℓ )≥M (v
s
ℓ ) for all ℓ ∈ {1, ...,k }, and therefore, by Equation (A.6) and because
M is non-negative, thatM a ,b (s ) is non-negative.
If ℓ= 1, then either v s
1
= t or v s
1
6= t . If v s
1
= t , thenM a ,b (v s
1
) =M a ,b (t ) =M (t ) =M (v s
1
). If v s
1
6= t , we have,
by the definition of V a ,b1 , thatM (v
s
1
) < a and a ≤M (t ) =M a ,b (t ) =M a ,b (v s
1
). Hence, in both cases, we have
thatM a ,b (v s
1
) ≥ M (v s
1
). Now suppose thatM a ,b (v sℓ ) ≥ M (v
s
ℓ ) for some ℓ ∈ {1, ...,k − 1}. Then, M
a ,b (v sℓ+1) =
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M a ,b (v sℓ ) + [M (u
s
ℓ ) −M (v
s
ℓ )] ≥ M (u
s
ℓ ) > b > a > M (v
s
ℓ+1), which concludes our induction step. So indeed
M a ,b (v sℓ )≥M (v
s
ℓ ) for all ℓ ∈ {1, ...,k }.
Next, we show that Qs (M
a ,b (s ·))≤M a ,b (s ) for all s ∈X ∗, and hence, thatM is a non-negative supermartin-
gale. Consider any s ∈X ∗. If s ∈ [V a ,bk ,U
a ,b
k ) for some k ∈N, it follows from Equation (A.1) that
Qs (M
a ,b (s ·)) =Qs (M
a ,b (s ) +M (s ·)−M (s ))
E8
= Qs (M (s ·)) +M
a ,b (s )−M (s )≤M a ,b (s ),
where wewere allowed to use E8 becauseM (s )<+∞ as a consequence of s ∈ [V a ,bk ,U
a ,b
k ) and the definitions of
V a ,bk andU
a ,b
k , andwhere the last step follows fromM being a supermartingale and 0≤M (s )<+∞. Otherwise,
if s 6∈ [V a ,bk ,U
a ,b
k ) for all k ∈ N, we have that Qs (M
a ,b (s ·)) =Qs (M
a ,b (s )) =M a ,b (s ), where we have used E7 for
the last inequality. Hence, we have that Qs (M
a ,b (s ·)) ≤M a ,b (s ) for all s ∈ X ∗, and we can therefore infer that
M a ,b is indeed a non-negative supermartingale.
Let us now show thatM a ,b converges to +∞ on all pathsω∈ Γ (t ) for which Equation (A.2) holds. Consider
such a path ω. First, it follows from liminfM (ω) < a that there exists some n1 ∈ N0 such that ωn1 ⊒ t and
M (ωn1 ) < a . Take the first such n1. Then it follows from the definition of V
a ,b
1 thatω
n1 ∈ V a ,b1 . Next, it follows
from limsupM (ω) > b that there exists somem1 ∈ N0 for whichm1 > n1 andM (ω
m1 ) > b . Take the first such
m1. Then it follows from the definition of U
a ,b
1 that ω
m1 ∈ U a ,b1 . Repeating similar arguments over and over
again allows us to conclude that ω goes through all the cuts V a ,b1 ⊏U
a ,b
1 ⊏ V
a ,b
2 ⊏ · · · ⊏ V
a ,b
k ⊏U
a ,b
k ⊏ · · · . For
all n > n1, let kn ∈N be the index such that V
a ,b
kn
⊏ωn and V a ,bkn+1 6⊏ω
n . Note that kn → +∞ for n → +∞. Now,
if V a ,bkn ⊏ ω
n and U a ,bkn 6⊏ ω
n for some n > n1, then we use Equation (A.4) to see that M
a ,b (ωn ) −M a ,b (t ) is
bounded below by (kn − 1)(b − a ) +M (ω
n )− a ≥ (kn − 1)(b − a )− a [M is non-negative]. If on the other hand
U a ,bkn ⊏ ω
n and V a ,bkn+1 6⊏ ω
n for some n > n1, then Equation (A.5) implies thatM a ,b (ωn )−M a ,b (t ) is bounded
below by kn (b −a )≥ (kn −1)(b −a )−a . All together,M a ,b (ωn )−M a ,b (t ) is bounded below by (kn −1)(b −a )−a
for all n > n1, which implies that
lim
n→+∞
 
M a ,b (ωn )−M a ,b (t )

≥ lim
n→+∞
(kn − 1)(b −a )−a =+∞,
because limn→+∞kn =+∞ and (b −a )> 0. This also implies that limn→+∞M
a ,b (ωn ) = +∞ becauseM a ,b (t ) =
M (t ) = 1.
We now use the countable set of rational couples K := {(a ,b )∈Q2 : 0< a < b } to define the processM ∗:
M ∗ :=
∑
(a ,b )∈K
w a ,bM a ,b ,
with coefficients w a ,b > 0 that sum to 1. Hence, M ∗ is a countable convex combination of the non-negative
supermartingalesM a ,b . By Lemma 12,M ∗ is then a non-negative supermartingale. It is moreover clear that
M ∗(t ) =M (t ) = 1, implying, togetherwith its non-negativity, thatM ∗ is a t -test supermartingale. We now show
thatM ∗ converges in the desired way as described by the proposition.
IfM doesnot converge toanextended real numberonsomepathω∈ Γ (t ), then liminfM (ω)< limsupM (ω).
Since liminfM (ω)≥ infs∈X ∗M (s )≥ 0, there is at least one couple (a
′,b ′) ∈ K such that liminfM (ω)< a ′ < b ′ <
limsupM (ω), and as a consequenceM a
′,b ′ converges to +∞ onω. Then also limw a
′,b ′M a
′ ,b ′ (ω) = +∞ since
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w a
′,b ′ > 0. For all other couples (a ,b ) ∈ K \ {(a ′,b ′)}, we have that w a ,bM a ,b is non-negative, soM ∗ indeed
converges to +∞ onω.
Finally, we show thatM ∗ converges in R on every path ω ∈ Γ (t ) whereM converges to a real number. Fix
any suchω ∈ Γ (t ). Then for any ε ∈R>0, there is an n
∗ ∈N0 such that, for all ℓ≥ n ≥ n
∗, |M (ωℓ)−M (ωn )| ≤ ε and
thereforeM (ωℓ)−M (ωn )≥−ε. Now fix any couple of rational numbers 0< a < b and, for any i ∈N, let vωi and
uωi be the situations in respectively V
a ,b
i andU
a ,b
i whereω passes through [if it passes through these cuts]. We
prove thatM a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (ωn )≥−2ε for any ℓ≥ n ≥ n ∗. To do so, let us distinguish the following four cases:
• V a ,b1 6⊏ω
n orU a ,bk ⊏ω
n 6⊐ V a ,bk+1 for some k ∈N and moreover, V
a ,b
1 6⊏ω
ℓ orU a ,bk ′ ⊏ω
ℓ 6⊐ V a ,bk ′+1 for some k
′ ∈N.
Using Equations (A.3) and (A.5) for bothωn andωℓ, we get that
M a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (ωn ) = [M a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (t )]− [M a ,b (ωn )−M a ,b (t )]
=
k ′∑
i=1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )]−
k∑
i=1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )],
where we assume k ′ = 0 ifV a ,b1 6⊏ω
ℓ and k = 0 if V a ,b1 6⊏ω
n . Since k ′ ≥ k [becausen ≤ ℓ and thereforeωn ⊑ωℓ]
andM (uωi )−M (v
ω
i ) > b − a > 0 for all i ∈ N, we have thatM
a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (ωn ) ≥ 0 > −2ε [where we also
implicitly use the convention that +∞−∞=+∞].
• V a ,b1 6⊏ ω
n or U a ,bk ⊏ ω
n 6⊐ V a ,bk+1 for some k ∈ N and moreover, V
a ,b
k ′ ⊏ ω
ℓ 6⊐ U a ,bk ′ for some k
′ ∈ N. Using
Equations (A.3) and (A.5) forωn and Equation (A.4) forωℓ, we find that
M a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (ωn ) = [M a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (t )]− [M a ,b (ωn )−M a ,b (t )]
=
k ′−1∑
i=1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )] +M (ω
ℓ)−M (vωk ′ )

−
k∑
i=1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )], (A.7)
where we assume k = 0 if V a ,b1 6⊏ ω
n . Note that k ′ ≥ k + 1, because k ′ ≥ k [since ωn ⊑ ωℓ] and k ′ = k is
impossible. Indeed, if k = 0, k ′ = k is impossible because k ′ ∈ N. Otherwise, if k > 0, k ′ = k would imply
thatU a ,bk ′ =U
a ,b
k ⊏ ω
n ⊑ ωℓ, contradicting the assumption that ωℓ 6⊐U a ,bk ′ . Hence, taking into account that
M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i ) > b − a > 0 for all i ∈ N, we infer from (A.7) thatM
a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (ωn ) ≥M (ωℓ)−M (vωk ′ )
[again, also using the convention that +∞−∞=+∞]. Finally, observe thatωn
∗
⊑ωn ⊑ vωk+1 ⊑ v
ω
k ′ ⊏ω
ℓ—the
situation vωk+1 exists because V
a ,b
k+1 ⊑ V
a ,b
k ′ ⊏ω
ℓ—and therefore, recalling how n ∗ was chosen,
M a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (ωn )≥M (ωℓ)−M (vωk ′ )≥−ε≥−2ε.
• V a ,bk ⊏ω
n 6⊐U a ,bk for some k ∈N andU
a ,b
k ′ ⊏ω
ℓ 6⊐V a ,bk ′+1 for some k
′ ∈N [we automatically have that V a ,b1 ⊏ω
ℓ
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because V a ,bk ⊏ω
n ⊑ωℓ]. Using Equation (A.4) forωn and Equation (A.5) forωℓ, we get that
M a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (ωn ) =
k ′∑
i=1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )]−
 k−1∑
i=1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )] +M (ω
n )−M (vωk )

=
k ′∑
i=1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )]−
 k−1∑
i=1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )] +M (ω
n )

+M (vωk )
=
k ′∑
i=1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )]−
k−1∑
i=1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )]−M (ω
n ) +M (vωk ),
where the second step follows because M (vωk ) is real [as a consequence of the definition of V
a ,b
k ] and the
third step follows because
∑k−1
i=1 [M (u
ω
i )−M (v
ω
i )]≥ 0 [since allM (u
ω
i )−M (v
ω
i ) are positive] andM (ω
n )≥ 0
[becauseM is non-negative]. Using the fact that k ′ ≥ k and that allM (uωi )−M (v
ω
i ) are positive, the equation
above implies that
M a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (ωn )≥
k ′∑
i=k
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )]−M (ω
n ) +M (vωk )
=
k ′∑
i=k+1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )] +M (u
ω
k )−M (ω
n )≥M (uωk )−M (ω
n ),
where the equality follows from the fact thatM (vωk ) is real-valued and the last inequality follows once more
from the positivity of allM (uωi )−M (v
ω
i ). Then sinceω
n∗ ⊑ωn ⊑ uωk —the situation u
ω
k exists becauseU
a ,b
k ⊑
U a ,bk ′ ⊏ω
ℓ—we infer from our assumptions about n ∗ that
M a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (ωn )≥M (uωk )−M (ω
n )≥−ε≥−2ε.
• V a ,bk ⊏ω
n 6⊐U a ,bk for some k ∈N and V
a ,b
k ′ ⊏ω
ℓ 6⊐U a ,bk ′ for some k
′ ∈N. Using Equation (A.4) for bothωn and
ωℓ, we find that
M a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (ωn )
=
k ′−1∑
i=1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )] +M (ω
ℓ)−M (vωk ′ )

−
 k−1∑
i=1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )] +M (ω
n )−M (vωk )

=
k ′−1∑
i=1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )] +M (ω
ℓ)−M (vωk ′ )−
k−1∑
i=1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )]−M (ω
n ) +M (vωk )
≥
k ′−1∑
i=k
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )] +M (ω
ℓ)−M (vωk ′ )−M (ω
n ) +M (vωk )
where the two last steps follow in a similar way as before; first using the real-valuedness ofM (vωk ) and the
non-negativity of bothM (ωn ) and
∑k−1
i=1 [M (u
ω
i )−M (v
ω
i )], and then using the fact that k
′ ≥ k and that all
M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i ) are positive. If k
′ = k , and therefore M (vωk ′ ) =M (v
ω
k ) ∈ R, it follows from the expression
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above thatM a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (ωn ) ≥M (ωℓ)−M (ωn ) ≥ −ε ≥ −2ε. Otherwise, if k ′ > k , then we use the real-
valuedness ofM (vωk ) to deduce from the expression above that
M a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (ωn )≥
k ′−1∑
i=k+1
[M (uωi )−M (v
ω
i )] +M (ω
ℓ)−M (vωk ′ ) +M (u
ω
k )−M (ω
n )
≥M (ωℓ)−M (vωk ′ ) +M (u
ω
k )−M (ω
n )≥−2ε,
where the last inequality follows from our assumptions about n ∗ and the fact thatωn
∗
⊑ωn ⊑ uωk ⊏ v
ω
k ′ ⊏ω
ℓ.
Hence, we conclude that for any ε ∈ R>0, there is an n∗ ∈ N0 such that M a ,b (ωℓ) −M a ,b (ωn ) ≥ −2ε for all
ℓ≥ n ≥ n ∗ and any couple of rational numbers 0< a < b .
To see that this implies thatM ∗ converges to an extended real number onω, assume ex absurdo that it does
not. Then there is some ε ∈ R>0 such that liminfM
∗(ω) < limsupM ∗(ω)− 2ε. As proved above, there is an n ∗
such that, for all ℓ ≥ n ≥ n ∗ and any couple of rational numbers 0 < a < b ,M a ,b (ωℓ)−M a ,b (ωn ) ≥ −2ε and
therefore alsoM a ,b (ωℓ)≥M a ,b (ωn )−2ε. Then it follows directly from the definition ofM ∗ that alsoM ∗(ωℓ)≥
M ∗(ωn )−2ε for all ℓ≥ n ≥ n ∗. However, this is in contradictionwith liminfM ∗(ω)< limsupM ∗(ω)−2ε, because
the latter would require that there is some couple ℓ ≥ n ≥ n ∗ such thatM ∗(ωℓ) < M ∗(ωn )− 2ε. Hence, M ∗
converges to an extended real number onω.
Proof of Theorem 18. Due to Proposition 17, there is an s -test supermartingale M ∗ that converges to +∞
on every path ω ∈ Γ (s ) whereM does not converge to an extended real number. Let B ∈ R be a lower bound
forM and letM ′ := 1M (s )−B+1 (M − B +M
∗). Since bothM ∗ andM − B are supermartingales [because of E8],
Lemma 12 implies that (M − B +M ∗) is a supermartingale too and therefore, since 1 ≤ M (s ) − B + 1 < +∞
[M (s ) is real], E9 implies thatM ′ is a supermartingale. Moreover,M ′ is non-negative because bothM−B and
M ∗ are non-negative andM (s )− B + 1 ≥ 1 which, together withM ′(s ) = 1, allows us to conclude thatM ′ is
an s -test supermartingale. Furthermore, consider any path ω ∈ Γ (s ) such thatM (ωn ) does not converge to a
real number. Then either it converges to +∞ or it does not converge in R [becauseM is bounded below]. In
the first case, it follows from the non-negativity ofM ∗ and the positivity of 1M (s )−B+1 thatM
′ also converges to
+∞ onω. IfM (ωn ) does not converge in R, thenM ∗ converges to +∞ onω and therefore, becauseM −B is
non-negative and 1M (s )−B+1 is positive,M
′ also converges to+∞ onω. All together, we have thatM ′ is an s -test
supermartingale that converges to+∞ on every pathω ∈ Γ (s )whereM does not converge to a real number.
Proof of Theorem 19. Since EV (·|t ) satisfies V6 for any t ∈ X ∗, we have, for any c ∈ R and any ω ∈ Ω, that
liminfn→+∞EV( f |ω
n ) ≥ f (ω) if and only if liminfn→+∞EV( f + c |ω
n ) ≥ f (ω) + c . Therefore, and because f is
bounded below, we can assume without loss of generality that f is a global extended real variable such that
inf f > 0.
We now associate with any couple of rational numbers 0 < a < b the following recursively constructed se-
quences of cuts {U a ,bk }k∈N0 and {V
a ,b
k }k∈N. LetU
a ,b
0 := {s} and, for k ∈N,
1. let
V a ,bk := {v ∈X
∗ :U a ,bk−1 ⊏ v, EV ( f |v )< a and (∀t ∈ (U
a ,b
k−1 ,v )) EV ( f |t )≥ a };
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2. ifV a ,bk is non-empty, chooseapositive supermartingaleM
a ,b
k ∈Mb such thatM
a ,b
k (v )< a and liminfM
a ,b
k ≥v
f for all v ∈ V a ,bk , and let
U a ,bk := {u ∈X
∗ : V a ,bk ⊏ u :M
a ,b
k (u )> b and (∀t ∈ (V
a ,b
k ,u ))M
a ,b
k (t )≤ b };
3. if V a ,bk is empty, letU
a ,b
k := ;.
Note that allU a ,bk and allV
a ,b
k are indeed (partial or complete) cuts. We nowfirst show that, ifV
a ,b
k is non-empty,
there always is a supermartingaleM a ,bk that satisfies the conditions above. We infer from the definition of the
cut V a ,bk that
inf
§
M (v ) :M ∈Mb and liminfM ≥v f
ª
= EV ( f |v )< a for all v ∈V
a ,b
k .
So, for all v ∈ V a ,bk , we can choose a supermartingaleM
a ,b
k ,v such thatM
a ,b
k ,v (v ) < a and liminfM
a ,b
k ,v ≥v f . Con-
sider now the extended real processM a ,bk defined, for all t ∈X
∗, by
M a ,bk (t ) :=
¨
M a ,bk ,v (t ) if v ⊑ t for some v ∈ V
a ,b
k ;
a otherwise.
It is clear thatM a ,bk (v ) < a and liminfM
a ,b
k ≥v f for all v ∈ V
a ,b
k . We furthermore show thatM
a ,b
k is a positive
supermartingale.
It follows from Lemma 11 that, for all v ∈ V a ,bk ,
M a ,bk ,v (t )≥ inf
ω∈Γ (t )
liminfM a ,bk ,v (ω)≥ inf
ω∈Γ (t )
f (ω)≥ inf f > 0 for all t ⊒ v. (A.8)
Since also a > 0, it follows thatM a ,bk is positive. To show that Qt (M
a ,b
k (t ·)) ≤ M
a ,b
k (t ) for all t ∈ X
∗, fix any
t ∈X ∗ and consider two cases. If V a ,bk ⊑ t , thenM
a ,b
k (t ) =M
a ,b
k ,v (t ) andM
a ,b
k (t ·) =M
a ,b
k ,v (t ·) for some v ∈ V
a ,b
k ,
and therefore Qt (M
a ,b
k (t ·)) =Qt (M
a ,b
k ,v (t ·))≤M
a ,b
k ,v (t ) =M
a ,b
k (t ). If V
a ,b
k 6⊑ t , then for any x ∈X we either have
that t x ∈V a ,bk , which implies thatM
a ,b
k (t x )< a , or V
a ,b
k 6⊑ t x and thereforeM
a ,b
k (t x ) = a . Hence, we infer that
M a ,bk (t ·)≤ a , and therefore, by E4 and E7, that Qt (M
a ,b
k (t ·))≤ a =M
a ,b
k (t ). So we can conclude thatM
a ,b
k is a
positive supermartingale.
Next, consider the extended real process T a ,b defined by T a ,b (t ) := 1 for all t 6⊐ s , and
T a ,b (t x ) :=
¨
M a ,bk (t x )T
a ,b (t )/M a ,bk (t ) if t ∈ [V
a ,b
k ,U
a ,b
k ) for some k ∈N;
T a ,b (t ) otherwise,
(A.9)
for all t ⊒ s and all x ∈X . We prove that this process is a positive s -test supermartingale that converges to +∞
on all pathsω∈ Γ (s ) such that
liminf
n→+∞
EV( f |ω
n )< a < b < f (ω). (A.10)
That T a ,b is well-defined follows from the fact that, for any k ∈ N and any t ∈ [V a ,bk ,U
a ,b
k ),M
a ,b
k (t ) is positive
and moreover real because of the definition ofU a ,bk . The process T
a ,b is also positive because, for any k ∈ N
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and any t ∈ [V a ,bk ,U
a ,b
k ),M
a ,b
k (t ) is real and positive andM
a ,b
k (t ·) is positive, and thereforeM
a ,b
k (t ·)/M
a ,b
k (t )
is positive. Furthermore, if t ∈ [V a ,bk ,U
a ,b
k ) for some k ∈N, we have that
Qt (T
a ,b (t ·)) =Qt (M
a ,b
k (t ·)T
a ,b (t )/M a ,bk (t ))
E9,E13
= Qt (M
a ,b
k (t ·))T
a ,b (t )/M a ,bk (t )≤T
a ,b (t ),
where the second step also uses the fact thatM a ,bk (t ·) andT
a ,b (t )/M a ,bk (t ) are positive [since, aswehave shown
above,M a ,bk (t ) is real and positive, and T
a ,b (t ) is positive], and where the last step uses the supermartingale
character ofM a ,bk together with the fact that T
a ,b (t )/M a ,bk (t ) is positive. Otherwise, if t 6∈ [V
a ,b
k ,U
a ,b
k ) for all
k ∈ N, then Qt (T
a ,b (t ·)) =Qt (T
a ,b (t )) = T a ,b (t ) because of E7. Hence, we have that Qt (T
a ,b (t ·)) ≤ T a ,b (t ) for
all t ∈ X ∗, which together with the fact that T a ,b (s ) = 1, allows us to conclude that T a ,b is indeed a positive
s -test supermartingale.
Next, we show that T a ,b converges to+∞ on all pathsω∈ Γ (s ) for which (A.10) holds. Consider such a path
ω. Then ω goes through all the cuts U a ,b0 ⊏ V
a ,b
1 ⊏ U
a ,b
1 ⊏ ... ⊏ V
a ,b
k ⊏ U
a ,b
k ⊏ .... Indeed, it is trivial that ω
goes through U a ,b0 = {s}. Furthermore, it follows from liminfn→+∞EV ( f |ω
n ) < a that there is an n1 ∈ N such
that ωn1 ⊐ s and EV ( f |ω
n1 ) < a . Take the first such n1 ∈ N. Then it follows from the definition of V
a ,b
1 that
ωn1 ∈ V a ,b1 . Next, it follows from liminfn→+∞M
a ,b
1 (ω
n ) ≥ f (ω) > b that there exists some m1 ∈ N for which
m1 > n1 andM
a ,b
1 (ω
m1 )> b . Take the first suchm1. Then it follows from the definition ofU
a ,b
1 thatω
m1 ∈U a ,b1 .
Repeating similar arguments over and over again allows us to conclude thatω indeed goes through all the cuts
U a ,b0 ⊏ V
a ,b
1 ⊏U
a ,b
1 ⊏ ...⊏V
a ,b
k ⊏U
a ,b
k ⊏ ....
In what follows, we use the following notation. For any k ∈ N0, let u
ω
k be the (necessarily unique) situation
in U a ,bk where ω goes through. Similarly, for any k ∈ N, let v
ω
k be the (necessarily unique) situation in V
a ,b
k
where ω goes through. For all n ∈ N0, let kn ∈ N0 be defined by kn := 0 if V
a ,b
1 6⊏ ω
n and otherwise, let kn be
such that V a ,bkn ⊏ ω
n and V a ,bkn+1 6⊏ ω
n . Note that kn → +∞ for n → +∞ because ω goes through all the cuts
V a ,b1 ⊏V
a ,b
2 ⊏ ...⊏ V
a ,b
k ⊏ .... For any n ∈N0 such that kn ≥ 1, we now have one of the following two cases:
1. The first case is thatωn ∈ (V a ,bkn ,U
a ,b
kn
]. Then by applying Equation (A.9) for each subsequent step and cancel-
ling out the intermediate terms, which is possible becauseM a ,bℓ (s
′) is real for any s ′ ∈ [V a ,bℓ ,U
a ,b
ℓ ) and any
ℓ ∈N [this follows readily from the definition of the cuts V a ,bℓ andU
a ,b
ℓ ], we find that
T a ,b (ωn ) =
kn−1∏
ℓ=1
M a ,bℓ (u
ω
ℓ )
M a ,bℓ (v
ω
ℓ )

M a ,bkn (ω
n )
M a ,bkn (v
ω
kn
)
.
Since M a ,bkn (ω
n ) ≥ inf f > 0 [due to Equation (A.8)], M a ,bℓ (u
ω
ℓ ) > b > 0 for all ℓ ∈ {1, ...,kn − 1} and 0 <
M a ,bℓ (v
ω
ℓ )< a for all ℓ∈ {1, ...,kn}, we get that
T a ,b (ωn )≥
b
a
kn−1M a ,bkn (ωn )
a
≥
b
a
kn−1 inf f
a

.
2. The second case is thatωn ∈ (U a ,bkn ,V
a ,b
kn+1
]. Then, by repeatedly applying Equation (A.9), we have that
T a ,b (ωn ) =
kn∏
ℓ=1
M a ,bℓ (u
ω
ℓ )
M a ,bℓ (v
ω
ℓ )
.
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SinceM a ,bℓ (u
ω
ℓ )> b > 0 and 0<M
a ,b
ℓ (v
ω
ℓ )< a for all ℓ ∈ {1, ...,kn}, we find that
T a ,b (ωn )>
b
a
kn
.
Since inf f > 0, a > 0 and ba > 1, and since limn→+∞ kn = +∞, it follows from the two expressions above that
indeed limn→+∞T
a ,b (ωn ) = +∞.
To finish, we use the countable set of rational couples K := {(a ,b )∈Q2 : 0< a < b } to define the process T :
T :=
∑
(a ,b )∈K
w a ,bT a ,b ,
with coefficients w a ,b > 0 that sum to 1. Hence, T is a countable convex combination of the positive s -test su-
permartingales T a ,b . By Lemma 12, T is then also a supermartingale. It is also positive, because all w a ,bT a ,b
are positive. Since it is moreover clear that T (s ) = 1, the process T is a positive s -test supermartingale. Further-
more, T converges to +∞ on the paths ω ∈ Γ (s ) where liminfn→+∞EV ( f |ω
n ) < f (ω). Indeed, consider such a
path ω. Then since f (ω) ≥ inf f > 0, there is at least one couple (a ′,b ′) ∈ K such that liminfn→+∞EV ( f |ωn ) <
a ′ < b ′ < f (ω), and as a consequence limn→+∞T a
′,b ′ (ωn ) = +∞. Then also limn→+∞w a
′,b ′T a
′,b ′ (ωn ) = +∞,
and since w a ,bT a ,b is positive for all other couples (a ,b ) ∈ K \ (a ′,b ′), the positive s -test supermartingale T
indeed converges to +∞ onω.
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